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Abstract 
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frameworks of selected EU trust funds (EUTFs) and the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRT). 
It explores how these EUTFs and the FRT add to and ‘mix’ the instruments set up under the 
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as a budgetary authority and the right to good administration. The study recommends 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Since 2014, four EU trust funds (EUTFs) have been established outside the EU’s budget. This study 
provides an overview of the complex governance of these four EUTFs, namely: 
• EU Trust Fund for Colombia, 
• EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration 
and displaced persons in Africa (EU Trust Fund for Africa), 
• EU Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (the ‘Madad’ Trust Fund), and 
• EU Trust Fund for the Central African Republic (the ‘Bêkou’ Trust Fund). 
The study also analyses a distinct type of instrument – the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRT). It differs 
from the four EUTFs mentioned above, mainly in that it remains embedded within the budget of the 
EU.  
The current trend of setting up trust funds and going beyond the EU’s budgetary rules raises a number 
of questions in terms of transparency and accountability. So far, policy-makers have justified going 
outside the EU budget on the need for more flexible and rapid EU funding instruments to respond to 
various emergencies outside the EU. This study critically assesses the trade-offs made in the name of 
‘flexibility’ and ‘speed’ vis-à-vis democratic, legal and financial accountability and the EU’s budgetary 
integrity. In addition, the EUTFs and the FRT add to and ‘mix’ the instruments set up under the 
Multiannual Financial Framework. 
The EUTFs and the FRT are instruments for the EU’s external relations. For example, the FRT 
accompanied the EU–Turkey ‘Statement’ in March 2016 and the EU Trust Fund for Africa was launched 
at the EU–Africa Summit on migration in Valetta in November 2015. Similarly, the EU Trust Fund for 
Colombia was established with an aim of showing solidarity and political support for the Colombian 
government in concluding the Peace Agreement with ex-combatants of the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia. Thus, some argue that EUTFs may allow the EU to be more relevant and strategic 
in its external policies. At the same time, the question arises over whether such external policies should 
be elaborated in a way that overlooks the role of the European Parliament as an authority that provides 
democratic accountability for the EU budget and policies.  
The Lisbon Treaty took the direction of reinforcing the role of the European Parliament, to bring about 
more coherence and democratic accountability. The instruments assessed in this study work in the 
opposing direction, which is extra-Treaty (the EU–Turkey Statement) and extra-budget (EUTFs), and 
inject intergovernmental dynamics and democratic accountability deficits into European cooperation.  
This study does not constitute an audit of results or a comprehensive evaluation of these funding 
instruments or the projects implemented. More generally, the study addresses the EU added value of 
the EUTFs and FRT in light of the ‘Better Regulation’ agenda. The study focuses on the following five 
aspects: 
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• Establishment of the EUTFs and the FRT. The study reconstructs the processes that led to the 
establishment of these mechanisms in section 1.  
• The governance, management, monitoring and oversight of the EUTFs and the FRT. 
Section 2 describes how the boards, Operational Committees, coordination and quality control 
mechanisms function as well as the venues for democratic accountability.  
• Non-EU practices on trust funds and similar instruments that can serve as ‘promising 
practices’ for the EUTFs. In section 3, lessons are drawn from the funding instruments and 
mechanisms set up by the UN and by the World Bank. 
• A general overview of the results and wider consequences for EU external policies. 
Section 4 illustrates the dynamics on the ground in the Central African Republic, Ethiopia and 
Turkey. Furthermore, the study assesses the wider consequences of this funding for EU external 
policies on migration and development. 
• Conclusions and recommendations. Elaborated in section 5, the main conclusions and 
recommendations are also presented below. 
Recommendation 1: The European Commission should carry out a ‘fitness check’ under the EU Better 
Regulation framework, to assess whether the EUTFs and the FRT have met the criteria of effectiveness, 
efficiency, relevance, coherence and EU added value. 
The governance procedures for the EUTFs and the FRT deviate from the ordinary decision-making and 
potentially lead to more mistrust within the EU and when cooperating with third countries. Therefore, 
ultimately, they should be seen as exceptional or truly emergency-led instruments whose added value 
and effects on the ground should be very well justified and carefully monitored.  
Recommendation 2: The European Commission should re-examine whether the EU Trust Fund for 
Africa was established correctly as an ‘emergency’ EUTF and should duly justify why it does not 
constitute a ‘thematic’ EUTF. 
The EU Trust Fund for Africa is assessed as an interesting case in section 1, and it remains unclear why 
an emergency EUTF is needed to address the ‘root causes’ of migration, or what ‘emergency’ it seeks to 
address in the first place. Rather a ‘thematic’ EUTF would have been more appropriate in light of the 
scope and intervention logic of the EU Trust Fund for Africa, even though that would have excluded 
delegated cooperation through Member States (when Member States are also the main implementers). 
Recommendation 3: An express clause in EUTF constitutive agreements should be foreseen so as to 
explicitly exclude implementing organisations from the governance bodies.  
An assessment of the governance, management, monitoring and oversight of the EUTFs shows the 
major deviations in comparison with regular EU external instruments concerning governance. As the 
EUTF contributors, namely the European Commission and Member States, set up and make decisions 
on boards and Operational Committees, this changes the dynamics in selecting projects and 
implementing partners. The recurrent tendency to select Member States’ projects, lobbied for and not 
rarely involving their own implementing agencies, gives rise to questions over the transparency, 
efficiency and impartiality of the selection process. The European Court of Auditors, in its Special Report 
Oversight and Management of the EU Trust Funds  
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on the Bêkou Trust Fund, also highlighted a ‘conflict of interest’ in the project selection procedure of 
its Operational Committee.  
Recommendation 4: The EUTF constitutive agreements should exclude the a priori preference for 
delegated cooperation with Member States. 
Despite the European Commission’s readiness to use all existing flexibilities in management of the 
EUTFs, it could not be established that the EUTFs carry out implementation more quickly than the EU’s 
regular external-funding instruments. The delegated cooperation comes in principle with rather high 
overall management costs; hence, it is not apparent prima facie that EUTFs are more cost-effective. For 
example, in its Special Report on the Bêkou Trust Fund the European Court of Auditors stressed that 
the management fee of 5% does not include all management costs. The a priori preference given to 
implementation through delegated cooperation with Member States can be understood from the 
perspective of incentivising them to contribute to the EUTFs, but it later can hinder selecting the most 
cost-efficient projects. 
Recommendation 5: The procedures for establishing EUTFs should be rethought and fine-tuned, in 
order to include more venues for democratic accountability, preferably in the form of a right of consent 
or a right of scrutiny (or both) for the European Parliament in the constitutive agreement. 
Our study shows that EUTFs suffer from a number of ex ante deficits in democratic accountability. 
Through the comitology decision-making involved, the European Parliament can voice its concerns, 
albeit on a limited basis (ultra vires). Where European Development Fund-based EUTFs are involved, as 
in the case of the EU Trust Fund for Africa, this option is not available, although EU budget instruments 
may later contribute to such structures, for instance via the Development Cooperation Instrument. The 
EU Trust Fund for Africa constitutes a near continent-wide instrument with large resources (EUR 3.189 
billion) and with a distinguishable impact on the overall external relations on migration and 
development with Africa. Therefore, the EU principle of institutional balance should be respected and 
guarantee the meaningful involvement of the European Parliament in the establishment of the EUTFs.  
Recommendation 6: Due to the increased use of EUTFs, devising any kind of EUTF should be subject 
to an ex ante and ongoing/regular assessment of the impact on fundamental rights, when the EU goes 
abroad. In addition, to ensure a more qualitative overview of the project’s societal effects and human 
rights impacts, priority should be given to funding independent non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs). 
The impact on fundamental rights needs to be taken fully into account when designing the EUTFs. The 
European Ombudsman has already concluded in relation to the FRT that when the EU goes abroad 
even via a political agreement, fundamental rights should be respected. In addition, establishing such 
a large instrument should be subject to a proper ex ante and ongoing/regular impact assessment, 
including on fundamental rights, in line with the good governance practices of the European 
Commission. Independent watchdog NGOs should be enabled to critically monitor the government 
policies of third-country partners, as well as the impacts of the EU-funded projects. 
Recommendation 7: The EUTF decision-making procedures in Operational Committees on financing 
actions should include a right of information and a right of scrutiny for the European Parliament, as in 
the case of those under comitology. 
Policy Department D: Budgetary Affairs 
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It is positive that the Members of the European Parliament have gained observer status in the EUTF 
boards and the Commission responds regularly to their questions on EUTFs. Nevertheless, the 
European Parliament is not represented in the EUTF Operational Committees, where decisions on the 
actions to be financed are taken. Although the European Parliament is not part of the executive branch, 
it is important to safeguard the European Parliament’s rights of information and of scrutiny. These 
rights would normally be granted under the comitology structure for funding regulations and could be 
replicated. 
Recommendation 8: Instead of developing individual models for results-monitoring frameworks, the 
EUTFs and the FRT should foresee the implementation of a more harmonised model consistently 
applied across these different instruments. 
The study shows that the different EUTFs and the FRT are each developing results-monitoring 
frameworks, some of them promising, with different systems, apps and websites. It would be advisable 
for the Commission to share more of these experiences and potentially identify best practices in results 
monitoring, to be implemented consistently across the EUTFs and the FRT. This would also mitigate the 
issue of different reporting procedures across EUTFs and the FRT. 
Recommendation 9: Following the UN’s example, the Commission should set up a dedicated EUTF 
office to ensure consistent governance and management, including on results-monitoring frameworks. 
A virtual EUTF gateway should also be set up, as a single EU portal on EUTFs with easy access to all data 
regarding the EUTFs’ implementation and financial situations.  
This study also looks at promising practices from the UN and World Bank’s management of trust funds, 
as well as from the EUTFs. There are certain features of the approaches by these international 
organisations that merit interest for better ensuring the effectiveness and robustness of monitoring 
and scrutiny procedures of trust funds. The UN example of having a dedicated Multi-Partner Trust Fund 
(MPTF) Office that facilitates coordination and information sharing across different trust funds 
constitutes one of these. Additionally, the UN MPTF Office has an online platform where harmonised 
financial and governance data of all its trust funds is published and updated daily. This may enhance 
financial transparency by enabling the public to access data about donations and transfers of funding 
and to compare trust funds.  
Recommendation 10: Special focus should be given to ensuring that the objectives of the trust funds 
are fully consistent with EU general principles and legal commitments laid down in the EU Treaties, and 
that they build ‘partnerships’ ensuring a balanced EU policy approach. Projects covering one area must 
not be inconsistent with (or run contrary to) other EU policies and objectives, including on democracy, 
the rule of law and human rights, as well as respect of UN principles and instruments. 
The UN and World Bank show a clearer definition of their trust fund objectives against which to 
measure results, e.g. the UN Sustainable Development Goals and national development strategies. By 
contrast, EUTF objectives are broadly defined and often lack clarity, legal certainty or a common EU 
understanding in line with EU general principles and fundamental rights obligations. This in turn makes 
the use of (output, outcome and impact) indicators a rather limited exercise from a methodological 
perspective when measuring actual results and impacts on the ground. 
 
* * * 
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In all, understanding that the EU budget’s resources are limited and reaching their boundaries should 
trigger a strategic process within the Commission and the European Parliament concerning what the 
‘exit strategy’ from the increasing use of ‘emergency funding’ for cooperation with third countries on 
migration actually is. Continuing to rely on ever-increasing funding amounts to obtain cooperation 
with third countries in this field will prove unsustainable in the medium to long term. Over-reliance on 
third countries to solve internal EU policy dilemmas may in fact expose the EU to future ‘crises’ by 
making cooperation profoundly dependent on the political willingness and stability of the third-
country governments and authorities concerned.  
Lastly, as these EUTFs and the FRT are considered to be ‘emergency tools’ by their own logics, the 
European Commission should chart a path back to ‘normality’ and ordinary procedures as soon as 
possible. In light of the upcoming Multiannual Financial Framework negotiations and the revision of 
the Financial Regulation, the EU institutions should work together to preserve as much as possible the 
integrity of the EU budget, thereby foreseeing increasing possibilities within the EU budget structures 
to respond to any emergencies. This would reduce the need to set up instruments such as the EUTFs 
and the FRT, which despite their potentially valuable contributions, inherently pose challenges for the 
integrity of the EU budget, its democratic oversight and general EU principles, such as the one of inter-
institutional balance. They also pose far-reaching issues for consistency in EU foreign affairs priorities, 
commitments and policies. All these steps are necessary ways forward in order to ensure that EU 
funding does indeed enhance trust and not mistrust within the EU and when cooperating with third 
countries. 
 
 
  
“In light of the upcoming Multiannual Financial Framework negotiations and the 
revision of the Financial Regulation, the EU institutions should work together to 
preserve as much as possible the integrity of the EU budget, thereby foreseeing 
increasing possibilities within the EU budget structures to respond to any 
emergencies.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
Fuelled by the need for flexible and rapid EU funding instruments to respond to crises, four EU trust 
funds (EUTFs) have been established since 2014 (see Table 1). These different EUTFs bring together 
funding from different EU geographical and thematic instruments. In addition to the EUTFs, the Facility 
for Refugees in Turkey (FRT) provides a coordination mechanism for funding from various EU 
instruments and humanitarian aid, thus not taking the funding out of the EU budget. The EUTFs and 
the FRT have proven to be potent tools for the EU’s external relations, with the FRT accompanying the 
EU–Turkey Refugee ‘Statement’ in March 2016 and the EUTF for Africa being launched at the EU–Africa 
Summit on migration in Valetta in November 2015.  
Table 1. Overview of EU trust funds and the Facility for Refugees in Turkey – Main characteristics 
Notes:  
a) Agreement Establishing the European Union Trust Fund for Colombia, and Its Internal Rules (‘Constitutive Agreement’) 
between the European Commission and Member State Donors, Brussels, 2016. 
INSTRUMENT/ 
MECHANISM 
AIM TYPE GEO-
GRAPHICAL 
SCOPE 
AMOUNT  
PLEDGED 
(EUR million)  
AMOUNT 
DISBURSED  
(EUR million) 
YEAR 
SET UP 
EU Trust Fund for 
Colombia a) 
Supporting 
implementatio
n of the Peace 
Agreement 
Post-
Emergency/
extra-EU 
budget 
One country 
(Colombia) 
95 Contracted – 
72.9 f) 
2016 
EU Emergency 
Trust Fund for 
stability and 
addressing the 
root causes of 
irregular 
migration and 
displaced 
persons in Africa 
b)  
Supporting 
goals set by the 
EU–Africa 
Valetta Summit 
Emergency/
extra-EU 
budget/ 
European 
Develop-
ment Fund-
based 
Regional 
(North Africa, 
the Horn of 
Africa, Sahel/ 
Chad Lake)  
3.189  488.3 
(contracted – 
1.319) g) 
2015 
Facility for 
Refugees in  
Turkey c)  
Supporting 
implementatio
n linked to the 
EU–Turkey 
Statement 
Emergency/
within the 
EU budget 
One country 
(Turkey) 
3.000 1.885  
(contracted – 
3.000) j) 
2015 
EU Trust Fund in 
Response to the 
Syrian Crisis – the 
‘Madad’ Trust 
Fund d) 
Linked to the 
ongoing 
conflict in Syria 
Emergency/
extra-EU 
budget 
Regional 
(Syria, Iraq, 
Western 
Balkans, 
Turkey) 
1.410 k) 
(for 2017 
alone!)  
468.3  
(contracted – 
871.6 – for 
2017 alone!) l) 
2014 
The EU Trust 
Fund for the 
Central African 
Republic – the 
‘Bêkou’ Trust 
Fund e) 
Linked to the 
ongoing 
conflict in the 
Central African 
Republic 
Emergency/
extra-EU 
budget/ 
European 
Develop-
ment Fund-
based 
One country 
(Central 
African 
Republic) 
146  
(84 
received 
by the end 
of 2016) m) 
Contracted -
70.9 n) 
2014 
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b) Agreement Establishing the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing the Root Causes of Irregular 
Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa (‘Constitutive Agreement’), and Its Internal Rules between the European 
Commission and Spain, La Valetta, 2015. 
c) Commission Decision of 24 November 2015 on the coordination of the actions of the Union and of the Member States 
through a Coordination Mechanism – the Refugee Facility for Turkey – C(2015) 9500 Final, Strasbourg. 
d) Agreement Establishing the European Union Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, ‘the Madad Fund’, and Its 
Internal Rules (‘Constitutive Agreement’) between the Directorate-General for Development Cooperation and the Italian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development, Ref. Ares(2016)1329575 (Updated Version), Brussels, 2016. 
e) Agreement Establishing the European Union Trust Fund for the Central African Republic, ‘the Bêkou EU Trust Fund’, and Its 
Internal Rules (‘Constitutive Agreement’) between the European Commission and the Netherlands, Germany and France, 
Florence, 2014. 
f) It is presumed, that only for four projects approved by EUTF Colombia on January, 2017 there were 11 million paid, as it was 
confirmed during the interviews that these projects have already started. In addition, there were 17 additional projects 
approved/contracted in July and November, 2017 worth of additional EUR 61,9 million.  
g) EUTF Africa as of 27 of November, 2017 - https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/eu-emergency-trust-fund-africa_en.  
j) Based on the document “EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey: projects committed/decided, contracted, and disbursed – Status 
on 12/01/2018”. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/facility_table.pdf.   
k) Based on the “EU Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian Crisis – Factsheet”, updated as of January 2018. 
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/eutf_syria_factsheet-english.pdf. The sums are provided 
for 2017 only and does not give overview for the overall pledges from 2014.  
l) "EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, the 'Madad Fund' Projects contracted - Status 19/01/2018" 
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/madad_fund_signed_contracts_19_jan_2018.pdf.  
m) European Court of Auditors (2017) Special Report “The Bêkou EU trust fund for the Central African Republic: a hopeful 
beginning despite some shortcomings”, p. 6. 
n) European Court of Auditors (2017) list of contracted projects available in Annex 1 of the Special Report, p.2. 
Source: Authors’ compilation.  
 
The European Commission has hailed the EUTFs and the FRT as tools for increased flexibility and 
speed.1 Others argue that these EUTFs may allow the EU to become more strategic and comprehensive 
in its external action.2 There are, however, a number of unresolved questions around these EUTFs and 
the FRT. In essence, most of these questions stem from the fact that these EUTFs and the FRT add to 
and ‘mix’ the instruments set up under the Multiannual Financial Framework. This creates an increasing 
degree of fragmentation and complexity, leading to a lack of clarity, transparency, and mistrust. The 
main challenge is whether the EUTFs and the FRT respect the integrity of the EU budget and the rules 
and principles that govern it. Such lack of clarity also raises questions about the role of the European 
Parliament (EP) as part of the budgetary authority that provides democratic accountability for the EU 
budget.  
These challenges with respect to the integrity of the EU budget and democratic accountability are 
inherent to an approach that is extra-Treaty (e.g. the EU–Turkey Statement) and extra-budget (EUTFs), 
and which brings intergovernmental dynamics and democratic accountability deficits back to 
European cooperation. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty had precisely sought to reinforce the role of Union 
coherence and democratic accountability in the Union. 
It is the aim of this study to provide some clarity by carrying out an assessment of the EUTFs and the 
FRT, thereby informing a democratic debate on the current state of affairs and on the choices for the 
                                                             
1 See e.g. European Commission, “The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing the Root Causes of 
Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa – Strategic Orientation Document”, Brussels, 2015(d). 
2 Volker Hauck, Anna Knoll and Alisa Herrero Cangas, “EU Trust Funds – Shaping More Comprehensive External Action?", 
ECDPM Briefing Note No. 81, European Centre for Development Policy Management, Maastricht, 2015. 
Policy Department D: Budgetary Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
14 
future, in particular, for the next Multiannual Financial Framework.3 The tendency of recent years to 
add new EUTFs should be reflected upon carefully, in order to reduce complexity, increase coherence 
and consistency of EU action, and reinforce venues for democratic accountability that are trust-
enhancing.  
It should be underlined that this study is not an audit or evaluation and does not amount to drawing 
conclusions about the added value of specific projects. Rather, it focuses on the overall governance, 
management, monitoring and oversight structures of EUTFs and the FRT. 
The study was based on qualitative data gathering and analysis methods. Besides the desk research of 
the most relevant legal and policy documents, interactive research methods, such as interviews, focus 
group discussion and an online survey were conducted, solely for this research. The authors have 
conducted 22 face-to-face semi-structured interviews with the relevant stakeholders from the different 
Directorates General of the European Commission, European External Action Service and the European 
Court of Auditors (see Anonymised list in the Annex 1). Online survey as well as focus group discussion 
were conducted with International Organisations (IOs) and other Non-Governmental Organisation 
(NGOs) experiences with EUTFs and/or the FRT. Interviews, online survey and focus group discussion 
have all constituted the background research of this study under the conditions of confidentiality and 
anonymity. 
The study addresses their added value in light of the ‘Better Regulation’ agenda and guidelines of the 
European Commission and its specific understandings of such evaluations. This study focuses on the 
following five aspects, covered in sections 1–5: 
• Establishment of the EUTFs and the FRT. The various EUTFs and the FRT are designed to 
present very different funding instruments and for the FRT, a coordination mechanism. These 
differences in set-up design are key to understanding their current convergence and 
divergence in management and oversight. The study reconstructs in section 1 the processes 
that led to the establishment of the EUTFs and the FRT.  
• Current state of affairs concerning the governance, management, monitoring and 
oversight of the EUTFs and FRT. Section 2 of the study describes the current governance and 
management rules and practices in the EUTFs and the FRT. In particular, this relates to how the 
different involved boards, Operational Committees, coordination and quality control 
mechanisms function. The monitoring and oversight mechanisms are described with a focus 
on venues for democratic accountability.  
• Assessment of the degree to which non-EU practices on trust funds and similar 
instruments can serve as ‘promising practices’ for the EUTFs. This amounts to an 
exploration of the functioning of non-EU instruments similar to trust funds and facilities in 
section 3. At the international level, this relates primarily to funding instruments and 
mechanisms set up by the UN and by the World Bank. 
• General overview of results and analysis of the wider consequences for EU external 
policies. Section 4 presents a quantitative overview of approved, contracted and implemented 
projects, categorised by the implementing partners and priorities pursued. The study presents 
                                                             
3 Jorge Núñez Ferrer, “The Multiannual Financial Framework Post-2020: Balancing Political Ambition and Realism", CEPS Policy 
Insights No. 2016/2, CEPS, Brussels, 2016. 
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qualitative country case studies to illustrate the dynamics on the ground in the Central African 
Republic, Ethiopia and Turkey. Furthermore, we assess the wider consequences of this funding 
for EU external policies on migration and development. 
• Conclusions and recommendations. The study finishes by putting forward research-based, 
crosscutting conclusions and recommendations. It is argued that that EUTFs and the FRT raise 
a number of challenges for EU budgetary integrity and for democratic accountability. 
Specifically, at the governance level a number of risks are evident due to deviations from the 
regular governance of EU funding. This relates primarily to the role of implementing partners 
and to weakened venues for democratic accountability. The study highlights how more 
exchange of ‘promising practices’ between EUTFs and the FRT is possible, such as on results 
monitoring. Finally, the study urges a rethink about the EU funding structures and choices, to 
uphold the integrity of the EU budget, democratic safeguards, and sustainable migration and 
development policy goals. 
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1. COMPARING THE TRUST FUNDS’ FOUNDING ACTS AND ORIGINS 
This section compares different funds in light of how they were established and the rules put forward 
at their foundation. It briefly describes the legal founding acts and the origins of policy choices for the 
five selected instruments of this study:  
1) EUTF for Colombia, 
2) EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration 
and displaced persons in Africa, 
3) EU Trust Fund for the Central African Republic or the ‘Bêkou’ Trust Fund, 
4) EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis – the ‘Madad’ Trust Fund, and 
5) FRT. 
These four EUTFs and the FRT differ quite substantively. There is a major difference between the four 
trust funds covered and the FRT. However, the study also identifies divergences between the four trust 
funds. Some of these differences came about with the European Commission’s developing experience 
in handling the trust funds, and some stem from the peculiar policy environments in which they 
emerged.  
First, the study offers an overview of how the establishment procedure of the EUTFs works in general 
(section 1.1). The origins of the EUTFs, their respective circumstances, their levels of politicisation and 
the objectives pursued is another point of this assessment (section 1.2). Finally, the FRT is analysed in 
greater detail, since it counts with its own specificities when compared with EUTFs (section 1.3).  
 
1.1 ESTABLISHING EUTFS  
The establishment of any EUTF is bound by legal and policy choice considerations. The new Financial 
Regulation has legally foreseen the possibility of establishing an EUTF.4 Art. 187 of the Financial 
Regulation sets out the legal basis and Art. 259 of the Rules of Application of the Financial Regulation 
sets out more specific rules.5 When the European Development Fund (EDF) is involved in setting up the 
trust fund (as is the case for the ‘Bêkou’ Trust Fund and the EUTF for Africa), Art. 42 of the EDF Financial 
Regulation is relevant.6 
Art. 187 of the Financial Regulation stipulates a number of conditions with which an EUTF needs to 
comply: 
1)  establishment for “emergency, post-emergency or thematic actions”; 
2) “added value to the Union intervention”, referring mostly to a subsidiarity-type condition; 
3) “Union’s political visibility”; 
                                                             
4 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No. 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the Financial 
Rules Applicable to the General Budget of the Union and Repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No. 1605/2002, OJ L 298, 
26.10.2012, 1. 
5 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No. 1268/2012 of 29 October 2012 on the Rules of Application of Regulation (EU, 
Euratom) No. 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Financial Rules Applicable to the General Budget 
of the Union, OJ L 362, 31.12.2012, 1. 
6 Art. 42 refers to Art. 187 of the Financial Regulation and designates the competent committee for the EDF (the EDF 
Committee as defined in Art. 8 of the EDF Internal Agreement); see Council Regulation (EU) No. 2015/323 of 2 March 2015 on 
the Financial Regulation Applicable to the 11th European Development Fund, OJ L 58, 3.3.2015, 17.  
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4) “managerial advantages; 
5) “better Union control of risks and disbursements”; and 
6) no duplication of “other existing funding channels or similar instruments without providing 
any additionality”.7 
The bottom line is that the EUTFs should have ‘added value’ above and beyond national interventions 
and existing funding instruments. Moreover, the EUTFs need to be implemented in line with the 
general principles applicable, namely, “sound financial management, transparency, proportionality, 
non-discrimination and equal treatment”.8 It is for the Commission to carry out an assessment of 
whether these conditions are met for the establishment of an EUTF, as well as throughout its life span. 
The extent to which the Commission has carried out a formal analysis of these conditions at the time 
of establishment has been a point raised by the European Court of Auditors (ECA) in its Special Report 
on the Bêkou Trust Fund. 9 As information gathered through interviews for this study suggest, such a 
formal analysis is not a standard Commission procedure before setting up an EUTF. It does not mean 
that these conditions are not properly examined, but it is rather done through various internal notes 
and meetings.10 
The conditions for setting up the trust fund are mentioned in the legal acts involved in establishing the 
fund (the Commission implementing decision and constitutive agreement, as discussed below). As 
mentioned in section 2.2 below, the Madad EUTF for the Syrian Crisis provides a promising practice, as 
it sets out more extensively than the other EUTFs how the conditions for establishing an EUTF have 
been met.11 
The objective motivating the establishment of an EUTF is first and most importantly the need for more 
flexibility and visibility. Trust funds allow for setting new objectives, combining EU funding channels 
hitherto circumscribed by the objectives and governance procedures of their respective regulations, 
and attracting further funding sources from donors (primarily Member States). As Art. 187(6) of the 
Financial Regulation stipulates, the contributions to the trust funds are not integrated into the Union’s 
budget. With the EUTFs, a policy message is given, with increased EU visibility as an actor on the given 
theme or area. On the other hand, the ‘political’ weight of involved EU Member States was also stressed 
during the interviews.12 
Once the policy choice to establish an EUTF is made, the ‘mechanics’ work as follows: a legal structure 
needs to be set up – the constitutive act or agreement – and contributions need to be transferred to a 
specific bank account into which the collected funds are deposited. 
The constitutive act is agreed between the Commission and “other donors”.13 In practice, as is evident 
from the sections below, these ‘other donors’ are mostly EU Member States. Nevertheless, in principle, 
non-EU countries, private companies, foundations or even individuals could contribute to the fund. 
                                                             
7 Art. 187(1) and (3), Regulation No. 966/2012, op. cit. 
8 Art. 187(2), ibid. 
9  ECA, “The Bêkou EU Trust Fund for the Central African Republic: A Hopeful Beginning despite Some Shortcomings”, Special 
Report No. 11/2017, Luxembourg, 2017(a), pp. 17–20. 
10 Interview Nos 9, 10, 11, 12, 21 and 22, European Commission, November–December 2017. 
11 Preamble recitals 11-14, Agreement Establishing the European Union Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, 
‘the Madad Fund’, and Its Internal Rules, between the Directorate-General for Development Cooperation and the Italian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development, Ref. Ares(2016)1329575 (Updated Version), Brussels, 2016. 
12 Interview Nos 1, 20 and 22, European Commission, November–December, 2017. 
13 Art. 187(1), Regulation No. 966/2012, op. cit. 
Policy Department D: Budgetary Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
18 
The constitutive agreement includes a number of elements, also based on a template available for such 
acts.14 It includes a preamble outlining the considerations for setting up the trust fund, its objectives, 
its resources, its governance and management, its financial and implementation arrangements, and 
some final provisions on e.g. visibility, monitoring and conflicts of interest.15  
The constitutive agreement between the Commission and the donor cannot be qualified as an 
international agreement under EU law, as it is not concluded with a third country (although that is not 
excluded in principle). The consent of the European Parliament is thus not required in that light.16 
Under internal EU law terms, the Commission takes an Implementing decision, describing the foreseen 
trust fund, as well as authorising a Commission Director-General to sign the agreement.17 These 
implementing decisions find their legal basis in Art. 291 TFEU falling under comitology, except for the 
EDF-based EUTFs.  
Under the applicable comitology rules, the EP has the ‘right of scrutiny’ under the so-called 
‘examination procedure’, if the competent committee (Member State representatives) adopts a 
favourable opinion. The right of scrutiny entails that the EP can adopt a non-binding resolution that 
would argue that the Commission has overstepped its implementing powers (ultra vires). So far the EP 
has not exercised this power. Still, it would remain for the Commission to decide whether to take those 
arguments finally on board.18  
The rules are different for the EDF and its committee, not falling under the EU budget and the EU rules 
applicable to comitology (as it is extra-budget). This means that for the EUTF for Africa and for the 
Bêkou EUTF, the scenario of the EP’s scrutiny did not apply to the decision to set up the EUTF. If funds 
from non-EDF instruments are at a later stage transferred to the EDF-based EUTFs, it is at that point of 
transfer that the only window of opportunity for the EP to use its right of scrutiny opens, but not at the 
time of deciding to establish them. This situation of drawing from different external funding 
instruments but deciding the establishment of an EUTF through the EDF Committee leads to the spread 
of challenges inherent to the EDF’s extra-budget nature. In particular, it amounts to setting up through 
the EDF channel – outside the EU budget – the overall framework for a new EUTF (concretely the EUTF 
for Africa and the Bêkou EUTF), even though instruments from within the budget will also be governed 
by it.  
The Commission acts through the comitology procedures to take decisions on funding contributions 
to the EUTFs from the existing EU funding instruments.19 For example, when the Commission adopted 
the Implementing Decision regarding the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) funds 
contributing to the Madad Trust Fund, it went through the ENI Committee under the comitology 
                                                             
14 Interview No. 4, European Commission, November 2017. 
15 See e.g. Agreement Establishing the European Union Trust Fund for Colombia, and Its Internal Rules (‘Constitutive 
Agreement’) between the European Commission and Member State Donors, Brussels, 2016. 
16 Art. 216 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) clearly refers to a ‘third country’ to be involved. Art. 
218 TFEU stipulates the required consent of the EP in certain cases. 
17 See e.g. Commission Decision of 20 October 2015 on the Establishment of a European Union Emergency Trust Fund for 
Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa, C(2015) 7293 Final, Brussels, 2015. 
18 Art. 11, Regulation (EU) No. 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 Laying down the 
Rules and General Principles Concerning Mechanisms for Control by Member States of the Commission’s Exercise of 
Implementing Powers, OJ L55/13, 28.2.2011. 
19 See e.g. Commission Implementing Decision of 18 November 2016 on the second special measure for the 2016 ENI 
contribution to the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration 
and displaced persons in Africa, to be financed from the general budget of the Union, C(2016) 7277 final, Brussels, 18.11.2016. 
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‘examination procedure’. In this case, the ENI Committee gave a positive opinion – all 28 Member States 
voted in favour.20 Here, the EP has on several occasions asked for more time to assess a Commission 
implementing decision, for example, when the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) 
contribution to the EUTF for Africa was transferred. Yet the EP never formally used its right of scrutiny 
under the comitology rules. 
The contributions to the trust fund are attested by a contribution certificate that outlines usually i) the 
amount of the contribution, ii) the date(s) at which the contribution will be made, and iii) applicable 
arrangements if donors wish to form a ‘pool of donors’.21 The latter arrangement is used when donors 
do not want to individually meet the threshold for contributions (often set at EUR 3 million), but can do 
so in a pool. Such donors as a group of countries will have one vote in the trust fund board. For example, 
the Visegrad countries have done so under the EUTF for Africa. In the case of the EUTF for Colombia, 
though the total sum of smaller contributors has not reached the threshold of EUR 3 million, all of them 
are treated as equally important contributors, as in reality all decisions are made as a consensus among 
all donors and not by formal voting.22 
It is evident from the overview in this section that the establishment and funding of the trust funds is 
largely a Commission- and Member States-driven affair, with a negligible role for the EP in this process. 
The EP has never used its right of scrutiny regarding the establishment of EUTFs. Nevertheless, MEPs 
are getting increasingly interested in further overview and monitoring (see subsection 2.3.1 on ex ante 
democratic deficits).  
It should not be forgotten that, apart from the legal and procedural aspects highlighted above, 
establishing an EUTF sends a strong message of commitment, showing that the EU is dealing with 
certain issues (e.g. migration management, development cooperation) or supporting a process (e.g. 
the peace process in Colombia). Any full understanding of why and how EUTFs are established should 
not treat ‘the EU’ as a monolithic actor. Rather, the inter-institutional struggles and the multi-level 
venues of policy-making in the EU system should be taken into account. The different Commission 
Directorates-General and the European External Action Service may have different experiences and 
viewpoints, and also Member States may pursue their different priorities.23 Moreover, diverse EU actors 
attach different weight to the existing EU funding instruments, in which they have vested their 
interests. The EUTFs and the FRT thus arrive in a landscape already ‘crowded’ by financial instruments, 
actors and priorities. 
 
  
                                                             
20 Commission Implementing Decision of 8 December 2016 on the 1st special measure for the 2016 ENI contribution to the 
European Union Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian Crisis, the ‘Madad Fund’, to be financed from the general 
budget of the Union, C(2016) 7898, Brussels, 8.12.2016. 
21 See e.g. Art. 3.2.2, Agreement Establishing the European Union Trust Fund for Colombia, op. cit. 
22 Interview Nos 21 and 22, European Commission, December, 2017.  
23 Leonhard den Hertog, “Money Talks: Mapping the Funding for EU External Migration Policy”, CEPS Papers in Liberty and 
Security in Europe, No. 95, CEPS, Brussels, 2016. 
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1.2 COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE ORIGINS OF THE EUTFS 
Each of the EUTFs has different origins and logics. Some of them have been pushed primarily by 
Member States, such as the Bêkou Trust Fund by France, or Colombia Trust Fund by Spain, and others 
have been more Commission-led, such as the EUTF for Africa or the Madad Fund for Syria. The context 
in which they are established and the justifications for their need also differ. The policy agendas and 
pressures also vary considerably. For example, the policy pressures in the Commission on migration in 
the Mediterranean, playing into the establishment of the EUTF for Africa, are incomparable to those 
pressures leading up to the establishment of the Colombia EUTF. Moreover, the trust funds for one 
country, such as the Bêkou or Colombia Trust Funds, cannot be easily compared with multi-country 
and regional trust funds like the Madad Trust Fund or the EUTF for Africa. See Table 1 in the introduction 
for the chronological establishment of the five funds under review in this study. 
The Bêkou Trust Fund was set up at a point in time when the normal EDF programming under the 
structure of the National Indicative Programme was difficult, as there was no legitimate interlocutor at 
the government level. Evidently, the Central African Republic went through violent upheaval, resulting 
in forced displacement on a large scale. In that context, the Commission was examining ways to 
approve financial aid quickly. According to the ECA’s Special Report, the choice of an EUTF happened 
to be ‘appropriate’. Nonetheless, according to the ECA the Commission should have carried out a more 
formal and structured analysis of whether the conditions to set up an EUTF were actually met. In 
addition, the Commission should have engaged in a proper needs analysis that could inform the EUTF’s 
logic of intervention.24  
Following up from those findings by the ECA, it is always important that the Commission takes the 
necessary steps to ensure that an EUTF is actually the most appropriate instrument to set up in a 
particular situation. It is understandable that any EUTF establishment will be affected by policy 
pressures and the need for speed. That notwithstanding, as deciding to establish an EUTF constitutes 
a step with important repercussions for the coherence and integrity of the EU budget, the time should 
be taken by the Commission to carry out a thorough analysis. Such analysis should assess whether there 
is a pressing need to establish an EUTF in a particular situation. This crosscutting conclusion is relevant 
also to other funds and should clearly inform the ongoing (at the time of conducting relevant 
interviews – October –December, 2017) revision of the EUTF guidelines by the Commission’s 
Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO).  
The EUTF for Africa also has its idiosyncratic origin, namely as an EUTF for the Sahel Region. This region 
faces specific security, stability and development pressures, which were deemed to be best addressed 
by setting up a regional EUTF. The Lake Chad area was added only later, as this region also struggles 
with a number of stability and development challenges. The discussions on this EUTF for Sahel became 
rapidly overtaken by the issue of migration and the EU’s external relations on migration with African 
countries in the course of 2015. In that context, two other ‘windows’ of the EUTF for Africa emerged, 
namely the Horn of Africa and North Africa windows. The current structure of the EUTF for Africa with 
three windows is a result of the above-mentioned developments: i) the Sahel/Lake Chad window, ii) 
the Horn of Africa window and iii) the North Africa window.  
The Horn of Africa was seen as a major region of origin of ‘irregular migrants’ and refugees into the EU 
in 2015, whereas North Africa was seen as a major region of transit. Five North African window countries 
                                                             
24 See ECA (2017a), op. cit. 
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that were added latest were - Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. After adding these 
subsequent windows, the EUTF for Africa has acquired a stronger migration focus. The priorities differ 
across the initial and latter windows, with the Sahel/Lake Chad window up until today giving much less 
attention to migration management, migration and development or ‘root causes’ of migration in 
comparison with the other two windows, and rather focuses on more ‘traditional’ development issues. 
As the issue of migration in EU–Africa affairs became the policy focus of the EUTF for Africa, this 
changed quite radically its scope and rationales. Leading up to the EU–Africa Valetta Summit on 
migration in November 2015, at which the EUTF for Africa was launched, the policy pressures to show 
results in cooperation with Africa reached a high point. Compared with the other EUTFs, the EUTF for 
Africa is thus much more salient at the policy level, as part of international negotiations that resulted 
in the Valetta Declaration. The number of different Directorates-General involved and the ‘political 
masters’ at the Commission adds complexity. Five current recipients of the EUTF for Africa, namely -
Ethiopia (Horn of Africa Window), Mali, Niger Nigeria and Senegal (Sahel/Lake Chad Window) - were 
recently covered by the EU’s Migration Partnership Framework.25  Migration Partnership Framework 
foresees ‘more-for-more’ conditionality on migration, such as readmissions. The EUTF for Africa helps 
to enable such conditionality. The case study of Ethiopia below illustrates, how the ‘more-for-more’ 
conditionality is applied in practice, when disbursing EUTF funds to speed up the issue of readmission 
of irregular immigrants.  
Arguably, every EUTF also has an element of self-interest for the EU, though certainly not excluding 
many benefits for third countries. However, where an EUTF’s raison d’être is partly the attainment of EU 
public policy goals, such as on migration management and readmission, this raises a number of further 
questions. Particularly given that the EUTF for Africa was set up as an ‘emergency’ trust fund, this begs 
the question of what was the ‘emergency’ to which it attempted to respond. The logic was to address 
the “root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons”, which is inherently a development 
question, requiring a medium- to long-term outlook. Academic knowledge in this field is quite 
conclusive, underlining that drivers of migration are complex and that economic development could 
only reduce migration in the long term, if at all.26  
Rather, it seems that the emergency was perceived to be at the EU’s external borders, along the 
migration routes, and in the Mediterranean more specifically. Also, the emergency was embedded in 
the conclusion of a deal with African countries in Valetta, for which the EUTF for Africa indeed proved 
to be instrumental. In any case, the argument to address an emergency is much less clear for the EUTF 
for Africa (except its Sahel/Lake Chad window) than it is for the other three EUTFs that respond to a 
country/region in conflict, civil war and its consequences and aftermath (the Bêkou EUTF, the Syrian 
Crisis Madad EUTF or the Colombia EUTF). A ‘thematic’ EUTF for Africa, as provided by Art. 187(1) of the 
Financial Regulation, would perhaps have been more fitting. Yet that would have excluded the 
delegated cooperation, including with Member States, as the Financial Regulation clearly states that 
delegated cooperation is exclusive to emergency and post-emergency EUTFs.27  
                                                             
25 European Commission, Communication, "Establishing a New Partnership Framework with Third Countries under the 
European Agenda on Migration", COM(2016) 385 Final, Brussels, 7.6.2016. 
26 Hein de Haas, “Turning the Tide? Why Development Will Not Stop Migration”, Development and Change, Vol. 38, No. 5, 2007, 
pp. 819–41; Oliver Bakewell, “‘Keeping Them in Their Place’: The Ambivalent Relationship between Development and 
Migration in Africa”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 7, 2008, pp. 1341–58. 
27 Art. 187(2), 2nd para. in conjunction with Art. 58(1), Regulation No. 966/2012, op. cit. 
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Moreover, it has not become clear during the research why an EU emergency trust fund as such is 
needed to address the ‘root causes’ of migration in Africa. Existing development instruments, such as 
the EDF and DCI, themselves appear to already have a long-term and comprehensive development 
rationale (economic development as well as rule of law and human rights) that is inherent to addressing 
root causes of migration. This links directly to one of the conditions in the Financial Regulation for an 
EUTF, namely that it should bring added value above and beyond existing funding channels.28 That is 
not to say that the EUTF for Africa has not financed specific actions that may have added value, but 
rather to question whether an emergency EUTF was necessary as an instrument for this long-term 
objective. 
The Colombia EUTF was inscribed in the Peace Agreement between the Colombian government and 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Both the Constitutive Agreement and the strategy 
document closely follow the priorities included in the Peace Agreement.29 This sets the Colombia EUTF 
somewhat apart from the other EUTFs, as the EU was responding to a request of the Colombian 
government to support the implementation of the Peace Agreement, in particular in the area of rural 
development and reintegration of FARC ex-combatants. This makes the Colombia EUTF a post-
emergency EUTF under Art. 178(1) of the Financial Regulation. At the same time, whereas reintegration 
of FARC ex-combatants can be seen as an urgent need in a post-conflict situation, some of the other 
actions in rural development can be regarded as more ‘thematic’ or as having long-term objectives.  
The Colombian government is an active partner of this EUTF, and to facilitate its involvement, the EUTF 
for Colombia Operational Committee meetings are taking place in Bogota. In addition, the EUTF for 
Colombia gathered a large number of donors, as 19 Member States signed the Constitutive Agreement 
with the Commission (DG DEVCO and Director-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian 
Operations (DG ECHO)). Nevertheless, out of a total EUR 95 million, only a third of the contributions 
came from the 19 Member States. It is also the latest EUTF, as it was established in December 2016.  
The Madad EUTF for the Syrian Crisis was established to deal with the emergency and potential post-
emergency and has an objective to provide a “coherent and reinforced aid response to the Syrian and 
Iraqi crises”.30 Its geographical scope was later enlarged to include the Western Balkans, during the 
transit through the Western Balkans route at the height of the ‘refugee crisis’.31 The Madad EUTF also 
finances several actions in Turkey under the FRT, as described further below.  
Although the Madad EUTF for the Syrian Crisis Constitutive Agreement follows the set-up of the other 
EUTFs, there are a few different aspects that are relevant for further governance and implementation. 
It suggests that this EUTF has been set up exercising a higher level of diligence and discussion. First, 
the Constitutive Agreement devotes a considerable part of its Preamble to explaining why the 
conditions for setting up an EUTF have been met in this case, arguing why it provides added value and 
explicitly referring to the need to map the existing programmes and projects “to ensure maximum 
synergies”.32 Second, the Constitutive Agreement structures the voting rights in the Operational Board 
                                                             
28 Art. 187(3), ibid. 
29 European Commission, The European Union Trust Fund for Colombia, Strategy Document, 6 December 2017 (URL). 
30 Art. 2, Agreement Establishing the European Union Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, ‘the Madad Fund’, 
op. cit. 
31 Commission Decision of 21 December 2015 Amending Decision C(2014) 9615 Final on the Estbalishment of a European 
Union Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, ‘the Madad Fund’, C(2015) 9691 final, Brussels, 2015. 
32 Preamble recitals 11-14, Agreement Establishing the European Union Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, 
‘the Madad Fund’, op. cit. 
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differently from most of the other EUTFs, namely in proportion to the contribution per donor 
provided.33 The other EUTFs (except for the Bêkou EUTF) give one vote per donor, as from a certain 
threshold amount.  
This weighted system of voting rights is closer to the existing rules under funding committees 
(comitology). Some larger Member States like Germany have indeed complained along these lines, e.g. 
under the EUTF for Africa, namely that their voting rights under comitology have not been respected.34 
While that is factually correct, it concerns a policy choice to give one vote per donor, in particular to 
incentivise smaller Member States to contribute to the trust fund. Third, unlike the other EUTFs, the 
Constitutive Agreement does not give a priori preference to implementation through delegated 
cooperation agreements with Member States.35 As argued below in section 2.1 covering governance, 
it is exactly this preference with respect to implementing projects that has led to a number of 
challenges in the case of some other EUTFs. 
 
1.3 FACILITY FOR REFUGEES IN TURKEY 
The origins and establishment of the FRT are not comparable to those of trust funds. The FRT is not an 
instrument but rather a coordination mechanism.36 This means that the FRT works with and leaves 
untouched the existing funding instruments. Next, the novelty of the FRT is that rather than having 
Member State contributions to a separate bank account and other new governance procedures, the 
contributions are directly included in the EU budget.37 This is done under the so-called ‘external 
assigned revenue’ referred to in Art. 21(2)(b) of the Financial Regulation. Another difference at set-up 
is that the contributions of Member States are not dependent on voluntary contributions as donors, 
like in a trust fund, but rather are linked to a binding Commission Decision.38 
The Commission Decision that set up the FRT should thus not be confused with the implementing 
decisions that the Commission takes under the EUTF set-ups (authorising the signature of a constitutive 
agreement). Rather, the FRT was set up by a decision directly based on the EU Treaties, in particular Arts 
210 and 214 TFEU, which speak of the possibility for the Commission to “take any useful initiative to 
promote coordination between actions of the Union and those of the Member States, in order to 
enhance the efficiency and complementarity of Union and national humanitarian aid measures”.39 
The FRT origin has to be understood in the context of the EU–Turkey Statement of March 2016, even 
though that is not legally speaking its basis as it was set up before that date (24 November 2015). The 
FRT rather has to be seen in light of the Commission Joint Action Plan for Turkey. However, the FRT of 
                                                             
33 Art. 6.4.1, ibid. 
34 Interview Nos 11 and 12, European Commission, November 2017. 
35 Art. 10, ibid. 
36 Commission Decision of 24 November 2015 on the coordination of the actions of the Union and of the Member States, 
C(2015) 9500 Final, op. cit. 
37 This is not entirely novel as similar structures under external assigned revenue through transfer agreements are already 
possible under some DG DEVCO-managed instruments. However, for this magnitude and in the EU neighbourhood, this is 
certainly novel. 
38 Still, the contributions to the FRT remain voluntary, as no interest for late payment was deemed necessary; see Commission 
Decision of 18 April 2017 on the Facility for Refugees in Turkey Amending Commission Decision C(2015) 9500 of 24 November 
2015, OJ C 122, 19.4.2017, 4. 
39 Art. 214(6) TFEU. 
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course played a major role in bringing about the Statement, as Turkey clearly was going to agree to any 
mechanism if EU funding was mobilised.  
The EU–Turkey Statement itself raises questions of legality and democratic accountability, pending at 
the General Court of the EU, since it is not a fully-fledged international agreement.40 Nevertheless, the 
European Ombudsman in her own inquiry procedure has concluded that devising such ‘gentlemen’s 
agreements’ or informal political deals should not escape compliance with the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the right to good administration on the side of the European Commission 
during their implementation. Therefore, the European Ombudsman called for a proper fundamental 
rights impact assessment so as to secure their legality in the implementation phase (para. 25): “for all 
policies and actions of EU institutions and bodies which impact on human beings, any evaluation 
should contain an explicit consideration of the human rights impact of those policies and actions. Such 
impact assessments should have regard to the principle of proportionality.”41  
The Commission and the Member States held a number of meetings, where a consensus on the Facility 
emerged. One of the important documents that guides the functioning of the FRT, besides the legal 
Commission Decision, is the Common Understanding between the Commission and the Member 
States. This document outlines some of the governance structure of the FRT. This document was agreed 
on 3 February 2016 at the level of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) and 
essentially forms the backdrop of the actual start of the Facility from the moment the ‘deal’ with Turkey 
was made under the EU–Turkey Statement of March 2016.42  
Drawing from some of the aspects under the Common Understanding, the Commission Decision on 
the FRT was amended on 10 February 2016.43 This amending Decision laid down a number of elements, 
such as the express mention of the amounts involved (EUR 1 billion from the EU budget, and EUR 2 
billion from the Member States). It also highlighted that the existing instruments’ rules and regulations 
that are coordinated by the Facility shall be respected (the ENI, Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance 
II, Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace and humanitarian aid).  
The role of humanitarian aid was specifically mentioned, as well as the respect for the European 
Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. Although that is certainly to be welcomed, as it displays a clear 
commitment to respecting the existing rules applying to the EU budget, in practice this leaves 
unaltered the fact that humanitarian aid is mobilised on the basis of external relations considerations, 
namely intention to reach a deal with Turkey on the refugee and migrant flows on the Eastern 
Mediterranean route. Furthermore, the Common Understanding also explicitly states that “[t]he 
execution of assistance actions under the Facility shall be conditional upon strict compliance by the 
                                                             
40 Sergio Carrera, Leonhard den Hertog and Marco Stefan, “It wasn’t me! The Luxembourg Court Orders on the EU–Turkey 
Refugee Deal”, CEPS Policy Insight No. 2017/15, CEPS, Brussels, 28 April 2017. 
41 Decision of the European Ombudsman in the joint inquiry into complaints 506-509-674-784-927-1381/2016/MHZ against 
the European Commission concerning a human rights impact assessment in the context of the EU–Turkey Agreement, 
Strasbourg, 18 January 2017. 
42 Common Understanding Establishing a Governance and Conditionality Framework for the Refugee Facility for Turkey, The 
‘Facility’ between the European Commission and the EU Member States, Brussels, 2016. 
43 Commission Decision of 10 February 2016 on the Facility for Refugees in Turkey Amending Commission Decision C(2015) 
9500 of 24 November 2015, OJ C 60, 16.2.2016, 3. 
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Republic of Turkey with undertakings reflected in the EU–Turkey Joint Action Plan and the EU–Turkey 
Statement from 29 November 2015”.44 
This explicit mechanism of conditionality is one of the unique features of the FRT, in comparison with 
the EUTFs. This emphasis on conditionality is also reflected in the FRT Steering Committee meetings, 
as they are always split up between a part on ‘conditionality’ without Turkey present, and then a part 
on the FRT allocations themselves, where Turkey is present.45 The Common Understanding thus 
established conditionality in light of the Joint Action Plan and the November 2015 EU–Turkey 
Statement. Therefore, formally speaking the Facility is not linked to the EU–Turkey Statement of March 
2016, but at the policy level they of course could not be separated. 
The setting-up of the FRT and its origins reveal how the Commission, amid a ‘crisis’ atmosphere, tried 
to work out a ‘creative’ funding solution.46 Clearly, the Commission was partly entering unchartered 
territory. The choices of using a Commission Decision directly on the basis of the Treaties and staying 
within the EU budget are as such to be commended, as they avoid working without the EU budget 
structures, as the EUTFs partly do.  
  
                                                             
44 Art. 24, Common Understanding Establishing a Governance and Conditionality Framework for the Refugee Facility for 
Turkey, op. cit. 
45 Interview No. 5, European Commission, November 2017. 
46 Ibid. 
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2. GOVERNANCE, MANAGEMENT, MONITORING AND OVERSIGHT 
This section outlines the governance, management, monitoring and oversight procedures used by the 
trust funds. As the FRT is not trust fund, this section does not cover the FRT; nevertheless, internal 
budgetary rules apply (see more discussion in subsection 4.1.4). The EUTFs covered in this study do not 
all have identical characteristics, although their management procedures are very similar. It falls 
beyond the aim of this study to describe in detail all exceptions for the different trust funds or, for 
example, the regional windows of the EUTF for Africa.  
At the basic level, an EUTF implies having a trustee (the Commission) and a manager (being the staff of 
the Commission). The EUTF is funded with contributions from the donors, including the EU itself, 
Member States and sometimes third countries. These contributions are kept in a separate bank account 
for the EUTF. 
 
2.1 GOVERNANCE  
The EUTFs work with a two-level governance structure: i) a strategic level and ii) an operational level, 
respectively translated organisationally into the Trust Fund Board and the Operational Committees (or 
an Operational Board in the case of the Madad EUTF for the Syrian Crisis). The Commission acts as the 
secretariat for these bodies and as the chair.  
Figure 1. Governance structure model of EUTFs 
 
At both levels, the EU and the donors (mostly the Member States) are represented. They are referred to 
as the trust fund members.47 The trust fund members have voting rights, the Commission also has a 
veto right. The voting rights differ across the EUTFs, with the Bêkou EUTF according votes to the ratio 
of contributions made, but with the EUTF for Africa according one vote per donor.48 In the EUTF for 
                                                             
47 See e.g. Art. 5.1, Agreement Establishing the European Union Trust Fund for Colombia, op. cit. 
48 See Art. 6.4.1, Agreement Establishing the European Union Trust Fund for the Central African Republic, ‘the Bêkou EU Trust 
Fund’, and Its Internal Rules (‘Constitutive Agreement’) between the European Commission and the Netherlands, Germany 
and France, Florence, 2014. See also Art. 6.5.1, Agreement Establishing the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability 
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Colombia, also the Government of Colombia has a veto right as a partner of the EUTF. Interviews 
revealed that in the case of this fund, whereas the vote should be attributed to the ratios of 
contributions, de facto decisions are made by consensus among all donors without formal voting.49 
The Commission will be ‘accompanied’ by a representative from the European External Action Service, 
in the case of the EUTF for Colombia.50  
Decisions can be taken with a simple majority, but consensus is preferred and practised. There are 
further entities with observer status, such as non-contributing Member States, third countries and 
international organisations. Their participation usually depends on the thematic or regional focus of 
the meeting. A good practice of observer status with regard to coordination with other donors is found 
in the Madad EUTF for the Syrian Crisis, where a permanent observer status is given to the UN-
coordinated Syria Recovery Trust Fund.51  
The EP does not have formal observer status as per the constitutive agreements, but is invited to Trust 
Fund board meetings (not to the Operational Committees). Even though the EP is in principle invited 
to board meetings, it has not always used this position proactively. It has not attended a number of 
Strategic Board meetings, such as for the Bêkou Trust Fund, the Colombia Trust Fund and the EUTF for 
Africa. This is reportedly due to agenda scheduling issues (e.g. overlap with Strasbourg weeks and 
planned on Fridays) and the fact that some of the meetings have taken place in Bogota and Bangui, for 
instance.  
The Strategic Boards usually meet once a year and set the overall guidelines and objectives, such as at 
the beginning of the EUTF lifecycle in strategic orientation papers (or similar types of documents). 
Especially upon the establishment of a trust fund, the role of the Strategic Board is thus important as it 
formulates the intervention logic beyond the applicable constitutive agreement.  
These strategic orientation papers usually sketch the existing challenges to be addressed by the trust 
fund, including sometimes at the country level. These documents, however, do not easily compare with 
programming as exercised under, for example, the EDF. The strategic orientation papers often remain 
fairly general and do not provide as much context or stakeholder consultation-informed analysis. 
Although the trust funds thus draw their contributions from existing EU funding instruments such as 
the DCI and the EDF, it is not evident that the lessons learned through the programming procedures 
under these existing instruments are structurally taken on board in setting the strategic objectives for 
the trust funds. Neither does the strategic document amount to a fully-fledged needs assessment. The 
ECA has also highlighted the absence a formal needs assessment in its recent Special Report on the 
Bêkou Trust Fund.52  
It is in the Operational Committees that the decisions are made about the actual projects (‘actions’) to 
fund. These bodies can meet several times a year and are fed ‘action fiches’ or ‘action documents’ of 
proposed projects for approval. In practice, decisions are taken by consensus and the Commission 
never uses its veto power. Written procedures with ‘tacit’ consent are also possible at this level, but not 
                                                             
and Addressing the Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa, and Its Internal Rules (‘Constitutive 
Agreement’), and Its Internal Rules between the European Commission and Spain, La Valetta, 2015. 
49 Interview Nos 21 and 22.  
50 See e.g. Art. 5.1.2, Agreement Establishing the European Union Trust Fund for Colombia, op. cit. 
51 Art. 6.1.1(d), Agreement Establishing the European Union Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, op. cit.  
52 Paras. 21-27, ECA (2017a), op. cit.  
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often used.53 The Operational Committees are not the stage or venue to actually engage in an in-depth 
discussion on the projects. The consensus on the projects to approve is usually reached before the 
meeting, through a series of informal talks and meetings. When an ‘action fiche’ is voted upon, the third 
country or region concerned is usually represented and will voice its opinion, although de facto that 
has also already been discussed and agreed with the country or regional organisation.54  
This process entails that for a full understanding of the governance procedures under the trust funds, 
in fact more focus should be given to the stages preceding the Operational Committee meetings. The 
question is thus: How do project proposals arrive at the Operational Committee meetings in the form 
of action fiches? Constitutive agreements lack clarity on invitations to submit concept notes and their 
selection – this phase is not mentioned explicitly. Interviews revealed that in such a context certain 
ways of working have been developed by the EU delegations and Commission.55  
A key role is foreseen for the EU delegations in the third countries involved (with the exception of the 
Madad Fund, since there is no EU delegation in Syria). The EU delegations in third countries are the 
main entry point through which project proposals can be submitted by participating Member States 
and their agencies (when it is implemented via delegated agreements), and also by international and 
other organisations. This remains a process of policy priority-setting, which depends on the amount of 
lobbying and informal contacts with the delegation. This is not a formalised process, as there is no open 
call for proposals at this point. The focus group with international and civil society organisations 
confirmed the interview findings that prior to submission applicants gather support and push for a 
specific project simultaneously at the EU delegation, European Commission and also among other 
Member States.  
The role of the EU delegation is to provide a first scrutiny of potential projects. The constitutive 
agreements are not very detailed on this aspect and only provide basic rules on the eligibility of 
projects: namely that eligible projects should contribute to the objectives and purpose of the trust fund 
and its strategy, as well as that the projects should fall within the geographical scope of the trust fund.56 
These are merely eligibility criteria, not selection criteria. The vagueness of the eligibility criteria has led 
in certain funds to approve proper selection criteria. For example, the EUTF for Colombia eventually 
published a document that elaborates on the criteria and selection procedure.57 The document 
outlines a list of strategic criteria for the concept notes to meet and subsequently, a list of technical 
criteria for the action documents against which they are to be assessed by the Operational Committee. 
From the delegation level, the process is overtaken by the Commission Directorate-General level 
(DEVCO). Coordinated by the Commission, a quality support group or a similar group of EU expert 
officials examines the project proposals in light of their expertise. The point is to evaluate their quality 
and their expected cost-efficiency and added value. In the background, there is an ongoing negotiation 
between the Commission (different Directorates-General or sometimes involving a hierarchy), the 
Member States, the third country involved and sometimes the potential implementing partner. It is 
evident from the outcomes of the Operational Committees that ‘package deals’ are made with several 
                                                             
53 See e.g. Art. 6(4)(4), Agreement Establishing the European Union Trust Fund for Colombia, op. cit. 
54 Interview Nos 2, 3, 4, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 12, European Commission, October and November 2017. 
55 Interview Nos 1, 7 and 22, European Commission, October–December 2017; focus group with civil society, December, 2017. 
56 See e.g. Art. 9, Agreement Establishing the European Union Trust Fund for Colombia, op. cit. 
57 European Commission, “Operational Criteria for the submission of proposals to the EU Trust Fund for Colombia”, Brussels, 
May 2017(j) (https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/operational-criteria-submission-proposals-eu-trust-fund-colombia_en ). 
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projects approved together allowing for some give-and-take between the different actors involved. 
This rather organic process of project selection, sometimes without recourse to clear or fixed lists of 
evaluation criteria, allows a more strategic steering towards certain policy choices or priorities.58  
For example, in case of the EUTF for Africa, in particular the North Africa Window, the political 
prioritisation of ‘curbing irregular migration’ has thus resulted in certain projects aimed to strengthen 
the ‘efficiency’ and ‘capacity’ of border control agencies of third countries. For example, the North 
Africa window of the EUTF for Africa has funded the capacity building and technical support of the 
Libyan Coastguard.59  
In addition, such a high level of flexibility makes the whole process quite opaque. Not only does it raise 
questions about transparency and accountability, but also from the outside it is not clear how that 
process works in practice. This is not the case with the regular external EU programmes, where selection 
procedures and criteria are well defined. For example, international partnership agreements, run by 
the Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) set out clear 
selection criteria in light of results to be achieved by the relevant project or programme, whether it is 
to be implemented by a government or civil society organisations.  
                                                             
58 According to interviews, the use of selection grids at the pre-operational committee stage was limited: Interview Nos 4, 11 
and 14, European Commission, October and November 2017. 
59 European Commission, “EU Trust Fund for Africa adopts EUR 46 million programme to support integrated migration and 
border management in Libya”, Press Release, Brussels, 28 July 2017(k) (URL). 
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Figure 2. Project selection process used by EU trust funds 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
The Madad EUTF for the Syrian Crisis did at some point use a publicly available document entitled 
“Operational Criteria”, which was supposed to provide some more clarity to potential applicants.60 
According to the Commission, this was de facto discontinued at some point as too many applications 
were received that were found to be insufficiently relevant to the Madad EUTF. There are current 
indications that this EUTF is to shift more from such an open entry point of projects to the general way 
of working under the EUTFs, namely also referring potential applicants increasingly to an EU delegation 
and/or Member States (agencies). Under that EUTF, there was also more common use of selection grids 
used by experts in Commission evaluation committees that assess the proposals that had surfaced.61  
The often-perceived lack of clarity on selection procedures under the EUTFs, can discourage especially 
smaller non-governmental organisations (NGOs) from getting involved as implementing partners from 
the beginning. They may of course get involved again if an open call for proposals is launched at a later 
stage by the implementing organisation selected. Especially in the case of a Member State agency 
being the foreseen implementing partner, the dividing line between the Member State in its capacity 
as a donor deciding in the Operational Committee and the agency of that Member State is not always 
so clear. The EUTFs established to address emergency and post-emergency crises provide an option for 
                                                             
60 European Commission, “Operational Criteria for A) Concept Notes/proposals Submitted to the Madad Fund Manager, and 
B) Action Documents Submitted to the Madad Fund Operational Board”, Brussels, 2016(e). 
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delegated cooperation via delegation agreements.62 In light of the explicit priority given to Member 
State-led implementation under a delegated agreement in the EUTFs’ constitutive agreements (except 
the Madad EUTF for the Syrian Crisis), it is not surprising that many projects indeed end up being 
implemented by Member States and their agencies. This does give the impression that the decision-
making procedures may not always safeguard a thorough and open-minded analysis, with all options 
on the table, of what is actually the most capable and cost-effective implementing organisation. During 
the interviews conducted for the purposes of this study, it was mentioned that the ratio of applications 
received and those granted is quite high, indicating that Operational Committees do not have many 
projects from which to choose.63  
Alluding to this dynamic, the ECA highlighted in its recent report that a ‘conflict of interest’ could 
emerge in the Bêkou Trust Fund decision-making, especially where it concerns the contracting type 
and implementing organisation to be selected. Concretely, this related to the fact that Germany and 
France had appointed as representatives in the Operational Committees the implementing 
organisations, which would then be directly involved in the selection process itself.64 Where the 
implementing organisation can de facto not be separated from the donor (trust fund member) 
approving projects under the EUTF, this is certainly a questionable situation. Interviews revealed that 
the Bêkou EUTF manager was in the process of raising this issue with the Member States concerned.65 
It could not be established whether this practice of potential implementing agencies as members of 
the Operational Committee was a general practice under EUTFs. At least one case appeared, under the 
Madad EUTF for the Syrian Crisis, where the KfW is represented (through its lead in the Syrian Recovery 
Trust Fund), although it apparently asked to abstain when action documents involving it are voted 
upon.66 
The constitutive agreements actually allow for the appointment of agencies on the governance bodies 
of the EUTFs: the donor, e.g. a Member State, appoints a ‘full representative’ to act on the board and 
committee meetings. There is no specification concerning what type of representative can be 
appointed, thus in principle not precluding the appointment of implementing agencies.67 Even where 
the Member State ministry and their implementing agency can be distinguished at an organisational 
or personal level, as is normally the case, this does not solve the inherent conflict of interest by design 
in the trust funds. For example, the in-built priority for delegated agreements with Member States leads 
to a certain dynamic of Member States pushing for ‘their’ projects and deal-making among them that 
is difficult to avoid.  
The Commission assures that the EUTFs are in line with the regulations that govern the funding 
instruments from which the EUTF contributions are drawn. This appears to be the case indeed for many 
of the management aspects (see below), especially the more technical mechanics of the process. The 
governance, specifically of the selection process of projects and the implementing partner, is still quite 
                                                             
62 According to Albert de Groot et al. in the report on “Evaluation of the EU aid delivery mechanism of delegated cooperation 
(2007-2014)”, Ecorys, Rotterdam, November 2016 (URL), “[t]here are two main types of delegated cooperation, namely: 
Delegation Agreements (DAs): funds entrusted by the European Commission to development cooperation entities from EU 
Member States or other donors; and Transfer Agreements (TAs): funds entrusted to the Commission by EU Member States, 
other governments, organisations or public donors”.  
63 Interview Nos 20 and 21, European Commission, December 2017. 
64 Interview Nos 14 and 15, European Commission, November 2017. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Interview No. 7, European Commission, November 2017. 
67 See e.g. Art. 6(1)(3), Agreement Establishing the European Union Trust Fund for Colombia, op. cit. 
Policy Department D: Budgetary Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
32 
different from how this would work under regular EU external funding instruments, e.g. the EDF or the 
DCI. There, the Member States act mostly through the comitology structures, where their voting rights 
are also different.  
 
2.2 MANAGEMENT 
As in any funding instrument, governance and management interact and overlap. As argued above, it 
is rather at the governance level that EUTFs distinguish themselves from regular EU external funding 
instruments. In management, the Commission in principle follows the normally applicable rules and 
regulations. Nonetheless, due to the often short deadlines for contracting and implementation, the 
flexibilities of these existing rules and regulations are sometimes pushed to their limits. For example, 
the Constitutive Agreement applicable to the Colombia EUTF states that “[g]iven the Trust Fund’s 
objective in an emergency and post-emergency situation, flexible procedures appropriate to the local 
environment will be used to ensure that the fund is effective and responsive”.68 
Paradoxically however, in practice the setting-up of new governance and management working 
methods can mean that contract negotiations can take a long time, that new staff has to be hired at 
the delegation level and that new working relations have to be established with implementing 
partners.69 
The central actor in the management is the Commission, in its roles as both a trust fund manager and 
an accounting officer. These roles are responsible for a number of management tasks, such as acting 
as a secretariat for the board and Operational Committee, for the sound financial management, 
implementing projects (although the extensive use of delegated agreements limits that role) and the 
preparation of the annual report. Importantly, the Commission is also in the end responsible for 
drafting the action documents, although of course keeping in mind the process of talks and deal-
making as described in the previous section.70 
To cover those management costs, the Commission can take 5% of the contributions to the trust fund.71 
As the report on the Bêkou Trust Fund by the ECA has found, it is not always clear what exactly is 
covered by that 5%.72 In practice, it covers mostly contract agents hired by the Commission specifically 
for the trust fund, in both Brussels as well as the delegations. This excludes staff costs, for instance for 
permanent officials working on the trust fund for the Commission. In reality, the actual costs can thus 
be expected to be higher than the indicated 5%. As the ECA indicated, this is exacerbated by the rather 
frequent use of delegated agreements, inherently bringing further management costs and 
administrative fees into the picture.73 It is thus not clear prima facie whether EUTFs ensure a more cost-
effective management structure than other, regular EU external funding instruments. As this study is 
not an audit of any sort, we cannot definitely establish whether that is actually the case.  
                                                             
68 Art. 10,  Agreement Establishing the European Union Trust Fund for Colombia, op. cit. 
69 Evidence gathered from a focus group meeting with several IOs and NGOs representatives. 
70 See e.g. Art. 7, Agreement Establishing the European Union Trust Fund for Colombia, op. cit. 
71 See e.g. Art. 7(3), ibid. 
72 ECA (2017a), op. cit.  
73 Agreement Establishing the European Union Trust Fund for Colombia, op. cit.  
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The potential EUTF element of ‘leveraging’ contributions also is not prima facie clearly working: the 
Commission has had to make top-up contributions from the EDF/EU budget itself, as Member States’ 
contributions are not as forthcoming as expected. This is especially the case for the EUTF for Africa. 
The financial management includes a number of aspects, such as keeping the financial records, 
arranging bank accounts, putting in place internal control mechanisms, informing donors and drawing 
up the financial statements, as well as the annual accounts.74 It is explicitly mentioned in the 
constitutive agreements that “the financial statements shall be drawn up in accordance with EU 
accounting rules”. In that regard, there is thus no change in comparison with the Commission’s regular 
way of working.  
Just as for other EU external funding instruments, implementation can be done under different types 
of contracting, such as delegated cooperation agreements and direct awards, as well as open and 
restricted calls for proposals/expression of interest.75 As highlighted above, the EUTF constitutive 
agreements give specific priority to delegated cooperation with Member States (or other trust fund 
donors). The EUTF for Africa Constitutive Agreement reads: 
To avoid duplicating structures on the ground while making the best use of donors’ expertise and 
ensuring European Union visibility, delegated cooperation with Member States shall be the 
preferred option of implementation where the principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
can be clearly demonstrated. Delegated cooperation with other donors will also be considered. 
It should be noted that a similar clause was not included for the Madad EUTF for the Syrian Crisis, 
apparently because the Commission was not keen on it.76 The Madad EUTF only mentions that 
approved actions “shall be implemented in accordance with the implementing modalities provided for 
in the applicable Commission rules and regulations”.77 
The underlying logic of giving priority to the Member States/donors of an EUTF can be understood 
from the perspective of incentivising Member States to contribute to an EUTF. Although it does not 
constitute a guarantee that donors will get their projects financed, and in practice that is certainly not 
always proven to be the case, it nonetheless creates a certain dynamic of expectations and motivates 
the pushing of national interests. This dynamic of Member States attempting to recover their 
contributions was clear in one instance in the Bêkou EUTF, where France received essentially its 
contribution amount in a project.78 Moreover, there are several projects under the EUTFs where 
Member States have foreseen co-financing and where their implementing agency is also selected to 
implement.79 The choice to co-finance and the selection of implementing partner should in principle 
not be tied up, as these processes should be governed by their own logics.  
This overall dynamic gives rise to the question of whether the most appropriate and best available 
implementing partner is always selected, and whether the EU visibility is best ensured. This visibility is 
                                                             
74 See e.g. Art. 8, Agreement Establishing the European Union Trust Fund for Colombia, op. cit. 
75 Art. 8.3.4(e), ibid. 
76 Interview No. 7, European Commission, November 2017. The annex to the Constitutive Agreement does mention the 
Member States’ agencies, but among other implementing partners. 
77 Art. 10, Agreement Establishing the European Union Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, op. cit. 
78 France contributed EUR 15 million to the Bêkou EUTF. The French Agency AFD was under delegated cooperation for the 
“PRESU” projects, for around the same value. 
79 See e.g. European Commission, Document D’action de Fonds Fiduciaire de l’UE À Utiliser Pour Les Decisions Du Comité 
Opérationnel – Coopération Sud-Sud En Matière de Migration, 2017(e). 
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one of the intrinsic aims of the EUTFs, but if projects too often become Member State projects, that EU 
visibility is potentially weakened. As this report is not an audit report, we cannot establish definitely 
whether visibility is in practice weakened at the project level, but we highlight that there are potential 
risks. 
This dynamic of Member States pursuing their national interests, thereby potentially undermining EU 
added value and visibility, can also be observed under the regular external funding instruments (such 
as in the EDF Committee). The EUTF set-up exacerbates this dynamic, especially through the explicit 
priority given to delegated cooperation agreements with Member States (agencies) as well as through 
the absence of actual programming, making the whole process less prescribed by preset objectives. As 
described above, the Constitutive Agreement for the Madad EUTF for the Syrian Crisis provides an 
exception and, we argue, a promising practice, as it refrains from giving priority to delegated 
cooperation with Member States and their agencies. 
 
2.3 DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY DEFICITS AND EP OVERSIGHT 
The European Parliament has limited possibilities to carry out oversight over the trust funds, but still 
has some opportunities to ensure democratic accountability. This section describes the points in the 
lifecycle of the EUTFs at which the EP can intervene. It is based on the EU accountability literature, which 
distinguishes between ex ante, ongoing and ex post phases of accountability venues.80 The burgeoning 
academic literature on the accountability of semi-autonomous structures under the EU institutional 
and legal framework is also taken as inspiration here.81 
2.3.1 Ex ante accountability 
As explained above, at the establishment (when authorising the Commission to sign the constitutive 
agreement) and when the EU contributions are decided to be transferred to the EUTFs, there is the 
opportunity for the Parliament under comitology to scrutinise the Commission implementing 
decisions (except where EDF is involved). This constitutes a form of ex ante democratic accountability 
as the EP can adopt a resolution, although that is non-binding and can only invoke ultra vires grounds. 
The EP can thus not legally force a change to the objectives or scope of an EUTF. As such, the EP is not 
currently part of the establishment procedures, let alone that it would have an explicit right of consent. 
However, politically it could certainly send a strong signal, should the EP raise its voice under the 
comitology procedures and adopt a resolution. So far, the EP has not adopted a resolution, but is 
getting increasingly involved in ex ante monitoring. For example, the EP has carefully assessed the 
Commission Implementing Decision concerning the DCI contribution to the EUTF for Africa.82  
In general, the EP can ensure a low level of democratic ex ante accountability over EUTFs in comparison 
with the ex ante accountability over existing EU external funding instruments, such as the DCI, ENI or 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance II. The EUTFs draw from these existing EU external funding 
                                                             
80 Mark Bovens, “Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework”, European Law Journal, Vol. 13, No. 4, 2007; 
Sergio Carrera, Leonhard den Hertog and Joanna Parkin, “The Peculiar Nature of EU Home Affairs Agencies in Migration 
Control: Beyond Accountability versus Autonomy?”, European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2013, pp. 337–58; 
Elena Madalina Busuioc, The Accountability of European Agencies: Legal Provisions and Ongoing Practices, Delft: Eburon, 2010. 
81 Deirdre Curtin, “Holding (Quasi-)Autonomous EU Administrative Actors to Public Account”, European Law Journal, Vol. 13, 
No. 4, 2007, pp. 523–41. 
82 Interview Nos 9 and 10, European Commission, November 2017. 
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instruments that fall under the EU budget (with the notable exception of the EDF). These existing 
instruments are subject to the Multiannual Financial Framework negotiations generally and subject to 
negotiations at the instrument level. In these processes, the EP is fully involved in setting the amounts 
and priorities as it co-legislates on the funding instrument regulations, such as for the DCI.83  
The EDF constitutes a particular case, as an extra-budgetary instrument, producing certain impacts on 
the EUTFs and their democratic accountability. For example, the fact of the matter is that the EUTF for 
Africa subsequently also draws into its EDF-established nature EU instruments normally falling within 
the EU budget, such as the DCI. This results in a situation where DCI contributions (i.e. EU budget 
contributions) land in an already shaped strategic and operational context that was set up outside the 
EU budget (and outside comitology proper). This may be unavoidable under the current framework, 
where the EUTF for Africa draws primarily from the EDF, and is hence logically set up on the basis of the 
EDF and through its Committee. This EUTF for Africa practice could, however, be further impetus for 
considering the ‘budgetisation’ of the EDF,84 as it would address this issue. 
Certainly, the EP approved the new Financial Regulation and thereby the possibility for the Commission 
to set up EUTFs. Yet in light of the rapid and extensive use of EUTFs over the past years, it could be time 
to reconsider the procedures necessary to establish an EUTF. Especially the setting-up of the EUTF for 
Africa raises the question of whether it is in line with the principle of institutional balance85 that this 
type of large multi-country EUTF, partly dominating the policy and funding discussions with Africa, 
should only pass through a Commission decision in the EDF Committee. We argue that this goes 
against the spirit of the Lisbon Treaty and its promise of bringing more coherence and democratic 
accountability to the EU. 
Some argue that similar losses of EP oversight materialise when the EU contributes to non-EU trust 
funds, such as those run by the UN or the World Bank, therefore not posing a new problem to be 
addressed in the context of the EUTFs.86 Albeit factually correct, this cannot figure as a valid argument 
explaining the democratic state of affairs of the EUTFs, as they fall within the EU institutional and legal 
structure. Clearly the EUTFs are EU instruments, and as such cannot be compared with extra-EU 
instruments. The EUTFs concern instruments that, although formally outside the EU budget and 
managed through separate bank accounts, form EU funding instruments. Hence, discussions on their 
democratic oversight should be situated in the EU context and should be held in reference to EU 
developed norms on democratic accountability. This includes basic principles included in the Treaties 
and those in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Any other context of discussion would open the door 
to a disintegration of the EU institutional and legal structure and of the EU budget.  
2.3.2 ‘Ongoing’ accountability 
‘Ongoing’ accountability refers to those venues where accountability mechanisms can be exercised 
between the ex ante and ex post phases, i.e. when the exercise of executive competences is ongoing. In 
this study’s context, this refers to the accountability of the ongoing governance and management 
                                                             
83 See Regulation (EU) No. 233/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 Establishing a Financing 
Instrument for Development Cooperation for the Period 2014-2020, OJ L 77/44, 15.3.2014. 
84 For an EP resolution mentioning this, see European Parliament, Committee on Development (DEVE), "Report on the EU Trust 
Fund for Africa: The Implications for Development and Humanitarian Aid" (2015/2342(INI)), Strasbourg, 2016, para. 7. 
85 See Jean-Paul Jacque, “The Principle of Institutional Balance”, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2004, pp. 383–91. 
86 Interview No. 4, European Commission, October 2017. 
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activities of the EUTFs, such as decision-making by the boards and Operational Committees. In this 
ongoing phase, there is a risk of undermining the autonomy of the exercise of competence by the 
executive actor. This means that ongoing accountability should in principle be in balance with that 
autonomy, although clearly taking into account the potential risk that in the ongoing phase any 
irreparable damage could be done that cannot be remedied ex post. 
As revealed through our interviews, the EP is or will be invited as a de facto observer to the board 
meetings of the EUTFs. It does not have formal observer status under the constitutive agreements. The 
invitation to the EP to participate in the board meetings is a positive step towards including its 
democratic perspective. As mentioned above, the EP has not, however, always used this right to 
participate as an observer at the board meetings, which can be understood practically owing to difficult 
scheduling reasons (e.g. the EP’s ‘Strasbourg’ week and the usual unavailability on Fridays, or the board 
meeting was held in Bogota in one case relating to the EUTF for Colombia). The EP has recently become 
more proactive on this front. Several EP committees (namely the Committees on Budgets, on 
Development Cooperation and on Foreign Affairs) sent a joint letter on 13 June 2017 with respect to 
involvement on Strategic Boards. The EP requested that the relevant EP committee chairs be invited to 
each strategic committee meeting (see Table 2).  
Table 2. EP Committee involvement in ongoing monitoring of EU trust funds and the Facility for 
Refugees in Turkey 
Notes: AFET = Committee on Foreign Affairs; BUDG = Committee on Budgets; DEVE = Committee on Development 
Cooperation. 
a) Agreement Establishing the European Union Trust Fund for Colombia, and Its Internal Rules (‘Constitutive Agreement’) 
between the European Commission and Member State Donors, Brussels, 2016. 
b) Agreement Establishing the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing the Root Causes of Irregular 
Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa (‘Constitutive Agreement’), and Its Internal Rules between the European 
Commission and Spain, La Valetta, 2015. 
c) Commission Decision of 24 November 2015 on the coordination of the actions of the Union and of the Member States 
through a Coordination Mechanism – the Refugee Facility for Turkey – C(2015) 9500 Final, Strasbourg. 
d) Agreement Establishing the European Union Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, ‘the Madad Fund’, and Its 
Internal Rules (‘Constitutive Agreement’) between the Directorate-General for Development Cooperation and the Italian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development, Ref. Ares(2016)1329575 (Updated Version), Brussels, 2016. 
e) Agreement Establishing the European Union Trust Fund for the Central African Republic, ‘the Bêkou EU Trust Fund’, and Its 
Internal Rules (‘Constitutive Agreement’) between the European Commission and the Netherlands, Germany and France, 
Florence, 2014. 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
INSTRUMENT/MECHANISM RELEVANT EP COMMITTEE TO BE INVITED 
EU Trust Fund for Colombia a) BUDG, AFET & DEVE 
EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing 
the root causes of irregular migration and displaced 
persons in Africa b)  
BUDG & DEVE 
Facility for Refugees in Turkey c) BUDG & AFET 
EU Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis – the 
‘Madad’ Trust Fund d) 
BUDG & AFET 
The EU Trust Fund for the Central African Republic – 
the ‘Bêkou’ Trust Fund e) 
BUDG & DEVE 
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Although participation in the board meetings is certainly useful, the boards’ discussions remain at the 
strategic and general level. The EP’s input at that level can bring more democratic legitimacy to the 
debates about the general focus and priority of an EUTF.  
However, the decisions relating to what actions will be financed are taken in the Operational 
Committees. In the Operational Committees, the EP is not represented, because the EP is not part of 
the ‘executive’ branch.87 This is where the main problem in comparison with the normal EU funding 
decision-making structures surfaces (again, except for the EDF). For example, under the DCI, the action 
fiches or annual action plans are approved as Commission implementing decisions in the DCI 
Committee under comitology (Art. 291 TFEU). Here, the Member States will give their favourable 
opinion (or not), and the Council and EP have their scrutiny rights. As explained, this scrutiny right is 
limited in scope (ultra vires) and is non-binding. Still, it provides the EP with an important tool to remain 
informed (right of information) and to make a statement (right of scrutiny) if it deems that the 
Commission has overstepped its implementing powers. A similar tool does not exist for the Operational 
Committees of the EUTFs.  
Interviews revealed that at least for the Madad EUTF for the Syrian Crisis, the minutes of the Operational 
Committee (or Operational Board in the Madad EUTF) will also be shared with the Trust Fund Board 
members, including its newly appointed EP representative (MEP Marietje Schaake, ALDE).88 This did not 
appear to be standard procedure in the other EUTFs, but could be regarded as a ‘promising practice’. 
Another discussed option is to grant the EP observer status in the Operational Committees. This would 
ensure democratic accountability, but also may have some downsides regarding the degree of 
autonomy of the exercise of executive powers by the European Commission. In any case, proactively 
sharing the documents (especially action documents) and the outcomes (minutes) of the Operational 
Committees with the EP, giving it a certain timeframe for scrutiny, should be perfectly feasible without 
disproportionately harming the autonomy of the exercise of executive powers. The EUTF constitutive 
agreements also prescribe that representatives of EU institutions may have access to all documents 
and information.89 
This is even more so the case given that once actions are approved by the Operational Committees, 
they can in principle not be reversed, while they may have impacts on the EU’s external relations 
priorities, objectives and values as outlined in Art. 21 of the Treaty of the European Union. In light of 
the important actions financed, with their potentially irreversible impacts, a form of ongoing 
democratic oversight is justified. The most straightforward solution would perhaps be to simply 
replicate the EP’s comitology rights of information and of scrutiny under the EUTFs. It would not alter 
fundamentally the envisaged possibilities for the pooling of resources and the added value of the 
EUTFs, but would enable the EP to remain fully informed and to give its opinion on specific actions if it 
deems necessary. 
  
                                                             
87 Interview Nos 9 and 10, European Commission, November 2017. 
88 Interview No. 7, European Commission, November 2017. 
89 See e.g. Art. 11(4)(1), Agreement Establishing the European Union Trust Fund for Colombia, op. cit. 
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2.3.3 Ex post accountability  
The EP has several ways to exercise ex post democratic accountability over the EUTFs. Ex post not only 
refers to after the EUTFs’ life span, but also to after the execution of governance and management 
under the EUTFs. Hence it also covers, for example, annual reporting and opportunities for posing 
parliamentary questions and organising hearings. 
The EP is informed of the EUTFs’ progress through various reports issued by the Commission. Most 
importantly, the EP receives the annual accounts and the annual reports of the EUTFs.90 The annual 
report contains important information about the state of implementation under the EUTF, including 
project-level data.91 Moreover, the EP can pose questions to the Commission, as it does regularly, 
including on the EUTFs. This is an important horizontal tool for the EP to obtain information on the 
EUTFs’ implementation so far and often provides useful insights. For example, on 4 December 2017 the 
EP Committee on Budgetary Control had a hearing at which DG DEVCO representative Mr Stefano 
Manservisi was asked about the financial implementation of the EUTFs.92 In addition, the EP, in 
coordination with the Commission, can undertake field visits. During interviews with the European 
Commission, the researchers learned that some field visits were planned in 2018 to oversee the EUTF 
for Africa.93 
The discharge procedure constitutes the main ex post budgetary control procedure in which the EP is 
involved. In light of some of the challenges to ex ante and ongoing accountability mechanisms for the 
EP related to the EUTFs, this discharge procedure is a crucial tool for the EP to scrutinise the 
Commission’s management of the EUTFs. It goes beyond the scope of this study to describe in detail 
the discharge procedure, but some features that could be relevant for the oversight of the EUTF are 
given here.94 The discharge procedure is of course not specific to the EUTFs, but relates to the overall 
EU budget implemented by the EU institutions, in this case the Commission, including its management 
of the EDF (under a separate discharge procedure).95 Linked to this, the ECA is involved in its capacity 
of providing the statement of assurance. Special reports produced by the ECA, such as on the Bêkou 
EUTF, are also taken into account under a specific procedure on “ECA Special Reports in the context of 
2016 Discharge to the Commission”, for which the EP has its own (shadow) rapporteurs.96 The EP 
normally grants a discharge to the Commission,97 but the procedure itself provides opportunities for 
the EP to pose questions and obtain information on the implementation of the budget by the 
Commission. The Commission also has a legal obligation to address the EP’s observations.98 Therefore, 
general discharge procedures with respect to the Commission and EDF and in particular, the procedure 
                                                             
90 See e.g. Art. 11(4)(3), Agreement Establishing the European Union Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, op. 
cit. 
91 See e.g. European Commission, “2016 Annual Report – The Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes 
of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa”, Brussels, 2017(b). 
92 See the video of the EP Committee on Budgetary Control meeting on the 4th of December with the Director-General of DG 
DEVCO, Mr Stefano Manservisi http://web.ep.streamovations.be/index.php/event/stream/171204-1500-committee-cont . 
93 Interview Nos 11 and 12, European Commission, November 2017. 
94 See more in detail http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/581968/EPRS_BRI%282016%29581968_EN.pdf. 
95 Arts 48-50, Regulation No. 2015/323, op. cit.  
96 For the latest overview, see  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/130200/2017-10-18_Rapporteurs_Shadow%20Rapporteurs_2016%20Discharge.pdf. 
97 The last time the EP refused the discharge to the Commission was in 1998. 
98 See Art. 319 TFEU and Art. 166 of the Financial Regulation (No. 966/2012). 
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linked to the ECA special reports on EUTFs, could be better explored to inject more ex post democratic 
accountability.  
The most radical ex post mechanism for democratic oversight concerns the possibility for the EP to 
request the discontinuation of an EUTF. The Financial Regulation defines this as follows: 
The European Parliament and/or the Council may request the Commission to discontinue 
appropriations for that trust fund or to revise the constitutive act with a view to the liquidation of 
the trust fund, where appropriate. In such an event, any remaining funds shall be returned on a pro 
rata basis to the budget as general revenue and to the contributing Member States and other 
donors.99 
Although politically such an EP request would most likely mean that the Commission has no other 
choice but to discontinue an EUTF, legally this text of the Financial Regulation opens a number of 
questions. The word “request” could also suggest that this request is to be decided upon by the 
Commission, and could thus theoretically be rejected. Yet this would seem quite unlikely as it would 
defy the very purpose of the EP’s right to request the discontinuation of appropriations or the 
liquidation of the EUTF. It is also not 100% clear what the words “where appropriate” refer to precisely. 
It could refer to the request itself, or to the choice between the discontinuation of appropriations or 
revising the constitutive agreement to liquidate the EUTF. If “where appropriate” refers to the request 
itself, that would beg the question of who has the final word on that appropriateness, the EP or the 
Commission. The confusion may be exacerbated by the text of some constitutive agreements of some 
EUTFs, which indeed apply the appropriateness condition to the request itself.100 This would possibly 
open the (legal) door over questioning whether a request is ‘appropriate’. That notwithstanding, the 
opening of the second sentence “[i]n such an event” seems to imply that after the European Parliament 
and/or Council may make such a request the consequence will directly be that any remaining funds 
shall be returned to the budget. Should the EP and/or Council submit such as request, the Commission 
would have the obligation to follow. In addition, the constitutive agreements clearly refer to the 
request by the Council and/or Parliament for a “termination event”.101 
2.4 OTHER FORMS OF MONITORING AND FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT  
In principle, the regular forms of monitoring and oversight that exist under the EU Financial Regulation 
and its Rules of Application apply to the EUTFs. It is beyond the scope of this study to give an exhaustive 
list of possible monitoring and oversight mechanisms. A brief overview is given, after which we focus 
more in detail on the results-monitoring frameworks of the different EUTFs and the FRT. 
External audits are carried out annually and regular reporting mechanisms apply. Moreover, the 
Commission’s internal audit service is also competent to examine the EUTFs.102 The EU Anti-Fraud 
Office also exercises the same powers over the EUTFs as it does generally over Commission activities.103 
Some of the discussed EUTFs and the FRT have furthermore contracted private service contractors to 
                                                             
99 Art. 187(5), 2nd para., ibid. 
100 See e.g. Art. 17(2)(2), Agreement Establishing the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing the 
Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa, op. cit., clearly relocating and inserting the words “where 
appropriate” after the mention of the request itself. 
101 See e.g. Art. 17(2)(c), ibid. 
102 Art. 187(6), Regulation No. 966/2012, op. cit.  
103 See e.g. Art. 11(1), Agreement Establishing the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing the Root 
Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa, op. cit. 
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carry out monitoring and evaluation activities, such as those linked to their results-monitoring 
frameworks discussed below.104  
As mentioned above, the ECA may also decide to carry out an audit of an EUTF, as it has done with the 
Bêkou EUTF Special Report. The ECA will finish two special reports in 2018 that are relevant to this study, 
namely on the EU Trust Fund for Africa and the FRT, as indicated in its 2018 Work Plan. It has placed 
these reports under its ‘high priority’ category. For the FRT, the ECA will assess “the performance of the 
FRT system and projects”. For the EU Trust Fund for Africa, the ECA will assess “if the Commission 
designed and operated the EU Trust Fund for Africa well and whether it achieved its objectives” and 
“whether the EUTF added value to the EU response to migration, integration and security 
challenges”.105  
It should also be mentioned specifically that entities that carry out indirect management, such as the 
Member State development agencies or IOs under the EUTFs, are ‘pillar assessed’ by DG DEVCO prior 
to contracting. This implies an assessment of their internal checks, accounting and independent 
external audits. A number of further checks are in place during the implementation phase. Nonetheless, 
the DEVCO Annual Activity Report shows that indirect management with IOs and development 
agencies did have a high risk.106 
2.4.1 Results-monitoring frameworks 
The EU has set up the EU International Cooperation and Development Results Framework (EURF) in 
order to enhance DG DEVCO’s capacity to monitor the results of EU development actions, while 
improving accountability and transparency.107 The EURF lists a set of indicators structured on three 
levels. Level 1 indicators are used to measure the partner country’s overall development progress 
arising from the collective action of all development operators. Level 2 instead looks only at the results 
that can be link specifically to EU development actions, by using indicators that account for the overall 
contribution that the EU brings to the development progress of a country. Level 3 indicators are used 
to assess the performance of the European Commission in managing EU resources to meet 
development goals.108  
The EURF applies to all projects funded by DG DEVCO’s instruments for external action,109 including the 
Bêkou Trust Fund for the Central African Republic, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (only the 
Horn of Africa, and Sahel and Lake Chad windows), and the EUTF for Colombia. In addition to the 
general framework of DG DEVCO, trust funds can establish their own individual results frameworks, 
which are described below. 
                                                             
104 See e.g. the overview of project for the FRT, where a EUR 14.3 million project is foreseen with various implementing partners 
for a “Support Measure to ensure tracking and measuring results, verification of the proper use of funds, and communication 
on the implementation of funded interventions”. 
105 ECA, “2018 Work Programme”, Luxembourg, 2017(b), p. 5. 
106 See for this and an overview of further checks in place, section 2.1.1, European Commission (2017a).  
107 European Commission, “Launching the EU International Cooperation and Development Results Framework”, Staff Working 
Document, SWD(2015) 80 final, Brussels, 2015(c), 2. 
108 For the exhaustive list of indicators, please refer to www.europa.eu/capacity4dev/eu-rfi. 
109 The Development Cooperation Instrument, European Development Fund, European Instrument for Democracy and 
Human Rights, Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (for the component “Global threats” only), Instrument for 
Nuclear Safety Cooperation, Instrument for Greenland and their predecessor instruments covering the programming period 
2007–13 (European Commission, 2015 (c), pp. 3-4).  
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The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa 
This trust fund has developed a results framework that is common to all the windows. For each area of 
intervention, the framework lists concrete indicators to measure the expected results, while suggesting 
the data needed to verify the outcomes. For example, to measure the expected result of increased 
economic productivity the indicator is the “number of small enterprises by locality, sector (including 
numbers of them created by women, different age groups)”, which is to be measured with data 
collected through the implemented projects of the trust fund.110  
Projects are monitored internally by the project managers and the implementing organisations, 
through day-to-day control and eventual project reviews. Additionally, in the context of the EU Results-
Oriented Monitoring system, external professionals assess programme implementation through 
project visits and provide recommendations.111  
EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (the Madad Fund) 
The results framework established by the Madad Fund has the same structure as the EU Emergency 
Trust Fund for Africa, as it allocates indicators to each expected result and specifies which data are to 
be used. For example, to measure the improvement of municipal water infrastructure, the indicator is 
the number of operational facilities that were rehabilitated or built.112 In addition, from November 2017 
a new monitoring system will assess results on a quarterly basis and provide an online platform to 
follow implementation and reporting progress.113  
The EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey  
The FRT discussed its own results framework in 2017, in order to measure the achievements of the 
funded actions and to report progress in a consistent manner. The framework identifies indicators to 
compare actual performance with expected results at both the project and Facility levels. An online 
platform for monitoring activities is also foreseen.114 As mentioned in the Facility’s first annual report, 
the results framework was expected to be finalised in March 2017. However, at the time of writing the 
creation of a comprehensive results framework was still an ongoing process, also carried out by 
external contractors assisting the Commission. The upcoming results framework is supposed to 
comprehensively track the progress of projects. One challenge thereby remains the input of 
information from Turkish governmental entities, which do not always proactively support the 
functioning of such a framework for monitoring results.115 
The EU Trust Fund for the Central African Republic (the Bêkou Trust Fund) 
The Bêkou Trust Fund does not have a results framework in place and has not created concrete 
benchmarks at the trust fund level that can be used to compare performance with expected results. 
While some projects have their own results frameworks, they are not included in a comprehensive 
                                                             
110 The Results Framework can be downloaded from DG DEVCO’s website https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/eu-emergency-
trust-fund-africa-results-framework_en. 
111 European Commission, “2016 Annual Report – The Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of 
Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa”, Brussels, 2017(b), p. 16. 
112 The Results Framework can be downloaded from the trust fund’s website. 
113 European Parliament, “Written Questions to Commissioner Mimica, Hearing on 12 October 2017”, Brussels, 2017, p. 32. 
114 European Commission, “First Annual Report on the Facility for Refugees in Turkey”, COM(2017) 130, Brussels, 2017(d), pp. 
13-14. 
115 Interview No. 5, European Commission, November 2017. 
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framework.116 Nonetheless, since the trust fund is managed by DG DEVCO, the general guidelines of 
the EU results framework described at the beginning of this section apply. For the future, the European 
Commission envisages the creation of a results framework at the trust fund level, which would probably 
take the form of an agglomeration of the variety of project frameworks.117  
EU Trust Fund for Colombia 
The recently established EUTF for Colombia has not yet created its own results framework. Still, the 
Constitutive Agreement for Colombia mandates that each project is in charge of setting up indicators 
to measure performance. As the trust fund is managed by DG DEVCO, the EU results framework applies. 
Although DG DEVCO has general guidelines for a results-monitoring framework, EUTFs and the FRT 
have shown the intention to create their own specific frameworks, using different apps, websites and 
documents. For the EUTF for Africa, different windows have even established their own monitoring 
frameworks. The EUTF for Africa and the FRT are in advanced stages of developing a results-monitoring 
framework and the Madad EUTF is also putting a framework in place, while this is not (yet) the case for 
the Bêkou Fund or the EUTF for Colombia.  
One shortcoming that has arisen during interviews is that the officials who work for different EUTFs 
(and the FRT) are not always well aware of the practices implemented by their colleagues.118 More 
communication and cooperation across the trust funds (and the FRT) may be helpful for those who 
have not yet created a results-monitoring framework, or aim at improving their own. More crosscutting 
drawing of useful insights could be achieved.  
  
                                                             
116 ECA (2017a), op. cit., pp. 26-27. 
117 Interview Nos 14 and 15, European Commission, November 2017. 
118 Interview Nos 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 12, 14 and 15, European Commission, October and November 2017. 
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3. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ‘PROMISING PRACTICES’ 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The introduction of the Millennium Development Goals and the adoption of the Paris Declaration on 
‘aid effectiveness’ have stimulated the debate and catalysed major transformations in the context of 
international development and humanitarian aid. Besides the official development assistance, which is 
established on the basis of governments’ bilateral agreements, more concerted initiatives have been 
emerging and influencing humanitarian and development activities.  
In particular, multi-donor trust funds are financial agreements channelled by national or international 
organisations that pool together voluntary contributions from different donors. A multi-donor trust 
fund stands upon the principle that in case of emergency, the duplication of aid initiatives reduces the 
level of effectiveness of humanitarian and development actions (Paris Declaration, 2005). Accordingly, 
over time multi-donor trust funds have been increasing in number and size, contributing to address, at 
least partially, the problem of the fragmentation of international aid.  
In this context, international development organisations (IDOs), such as the World Bank and the UN 
together with other regional development agencies, have been playing a major role. Indeed, 
channelling the resources dedicated to humanitarian and development activities through specialised 
IDOs presents a number of advantages. First, IDO trust funds offer a common platform for donors. This 
makes it easier to reach a critical mass and to maximise the impact of aid initiatives. Second, the 
developed expertise of IDOs in setting up and managing multi-donor trust funds enable donors to rely 
on a well-oiled machine. This is particularly important when it comes to defining governance 
structures, contract frameworks and monitoring requirements, as well as audit standards.  
The World Bank and the United Nations are by far the most important organisations in the context of 
multi-donor trust funds. Even the EU, which has its own multi-donor trust funds, channels large 
amounts of funding through the multi-donor funds administered by the UN and World Bank. Indeed, 
of the EUR 4.7 billion that the EU budget gives to multi-donor funds, 53% is given to World Bank-
administered funds and 34% to UN-administered funds.119  
The increasing number of trust funds set up by the EU over the last four years may suggest a change in 
the European Commission’s strategy vis-à-vis the EU aid policy. In this regard, the visibility issue and 
high management fees have often been mentioned during the interviews performed for this study as 
two prominent reasons behind such a shift. Nevertheless, a comprehensive analysis of what has driven 
such a change lays beyond the scope of this study. At the same time, building upon the experience of 
IDOs would be good to strengthen the ability of the EU to deliver in developing countries. 
Leading from these considerations, this section aims at identifying trust fund ‘promising practices’ by 
exploring the use of such instruments by international and national actors. In particular, the analysis 
will exclusively focus on the governance structure of trust funds, the set-up procedure and the 
accountability and results-monitoring frameworks. The section is structured as follows: section 3.2 
reviews multi-donor trust funds managed by the UN and the World Bank Group; section 3.3 examines 
                                                             
119 Authors’ calculation based on European Commission, “Information note on multidonor trust funds supported by the 
European Union”, Brussels, 2016(d), p. 2. The complete list of TF supported by the EU can be found in Annexes IV and V of the 
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EU Member States and third countries; section 3.4 explores the EU blending instruments; and section 
3.5 compares the findings from above-mentioned reviews with the EUTFs. 
 
3.2 UN AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 
3.2.1 United Nations 
The UN system uses various types of international financial instruments, such as multi-donor trust funds 
to pool funding from UN agencies and external contributors and to finance development activities in 
a more effective and coordinated way. More than 95% of the UN multi-donor trust funds are managed 
by the Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) Office, for a cumulative value of approximately $10 billion since 
2006.120 
The creation of a new multi-donor trust fund is discussed and evaluated by stakeholders including UN 
agencies, potential donors and national governments. In this phase, an assessment of priorities and 
costs related to the new instrument is followed by a review of the existing funds, in order to avoid 
duplication. During consultations, a concept note is prepared, laying out the goals, the management 
structure of the multi-donor trust fund, as well as the potential contribution from interested donors. 
Once stakeholders decide to establish the multi-donor trust fund, an administrative agent is formally 
selected by the participating UN agencies. The trust fund’s terms of reference are finalised and the legal 
agreements are signed by the partners (a memorandum of understanding between participating UN 
agencies and the administrative agent, and a standard administrative agreement between donors and 
the administrative agent).121 
The decision to set up a multi-donor trust fund takes into consideration whether the potential fund’s 
function would bring added value. The MPTF Office identifies six functions that a multi-donor trust fund 
can perform: a) support policy and project coherence; b) consolidate development action by reducing 
fragmentation; c) provide targeted and specialised expertise on a particular issue; d) manage and 
reduce risk of governments and donors; e) enhance the capacity of national systems; f) provide access 
to innovative and transparent funding.122 
Although multi-donor trust funds are not required to follow a one-size-fits-all template, a standard 
governance architecture exists (see Figure 3). Donors transfer contributions to the administrative 
agent, which is in charge of managing and transferring them to the project implementing 
organisations (e.g. UN and government agencies and NGOs). An administrative agent signs legal 
agreements with donors and implementing organisations, evaluates the performance of the trust fund 
and provides financial reports. Disbursements by the administrative agent must be approved by a 
steering committee, which decides the trust fund’s strategy, allocates resources and monitors progress. 
The steering committee includes representatives of the government of the country of concern where 
                                                             
120 See Dawn Del Rio and Yannick Glemarec, Financing development together: The role of pooled financing mechanisms in 
enhancing development effectiveness, Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, United Nations Development Programme, New York, 
NY, p. 1; see also MPTF Office, “2016 Annual Report UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office” United Nations, New York, NY, 2016, 
p. 3. 
121 UN Development Group, “UNDG Guidance on Establishing, Managing and Closing Multi-Donor Trust Funds”, New York, NY, 
2015, pp. 11-13. 
122 Yannick Glemarec et al., “Designing Pooled Funds for Performance, a manual prepared by the Multi-Partner Trust Fund 
Office”, United Nations, New York, NY, 2015, p. vii.  
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the projects are implemented, the donors and the implementing organisations, and it is supported by 
the secretariat. The latter is in charge of monitoring, evaluation and coordination of projects, as well as 
day-to-day operations. 
Figure 3. Fund governance architecture 
 
Source: Glemarec et al. (2015), p. vii. 
 
UN trust fund operations are ruled by a single audit principle, which states that the administration of 
trust funds and the implementation of projects are audited both internally and externally. In particular, 
donors are not allowed to request additional external audits.123 
The MPTF Office has an online platform124 called the “MPTF Office Gateway”, where the public can 
access information about all the multi-donor trust funds and joint programmes in which the MPTF 
Office is involved. Each trust fund has its own page where exhaustive data about contributions, 
disbursements and donors is updated in real time. Additionally, the governance structure, the strategy 
and other relevant information is displayed, together with links to publications. Information listed in 
the Gateway concerns mostly financial and structural matters. Monitoring and assessment of results 
are published in separate reports by individual trust funds.  
According to UN guidelines, an effective trust fund design is one that translates the fund’s goals into 
concrete results on three levels.125 First, the long-term impact that the fund is expected to have on a 
group of people, which can be measured against an indicator every three to five years. Second, the 
fund’s outcome, or change caused by its activities, which is reached through the contributions of all 
funded projects. Third, the fund outputs that are easily measured, for example, in terms of changes in 
                                                             
123 Istvan Posta and Cihan Terzi, “Policies and procedures for the Administration of trust Funds in the United Nations System 
Organizations”, United Nations, Geneva, 2010, p. 26. 
124 See the website: http://mptf.undp.org/. 
125 Glemarec et al. (2015), op. cit., pp. 10-12. 
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skills or increased product availability. Output indicators are set for each project, which is directly 
accountable for its performance. 
In line with these guidelines, UN agencies set up their own results-monitoring framework, which is then 
applied to trust funds. A review of the results frameworks of several trust funds managed by the UN is 
beyond the scope of this study but, to give an indication of what this broadly entails, the framework 
set up by the UN Women agency is briefly described. As part of the Strategic Plan 2018–21, UN Women 
has set up an Integrated Results and Resources Framework (IRRF)126 which defines expected results and 
lists indicators to be used to assess the progress made. The framework has three levels of results: impact, 
outcome and output. Impact results are envisaged to be achieved by 2030 and aim at changing 
behaviours in the long term. Outcome results are those met thanks to the contribution of UN Women 
and are measured against shorter-term indicators, which nonetheless remain relevant for several years. 
Output results are obtained thanks to the direct action of UN Women in the short term. The IRRF 
establishes several outcome results that must be achieved to reach the intended impact. For each 
outcome, the IRRF has an individualised budget and several output indicators.  
Targets for 2021 are established for each indicator and yearly milestones are established to ensure an 
ongoing assessment of progress made. While indicators provide an assessment of actions taken by 
projects, a qualitative assessment of the effects and actual implications may be lacking. For instance, 
Indicator 4.1, measuring the number of gender equality reforms developed or being implemented by 
electoral stakeholders, does not allow to fully assess whether these initiatives have any societal impact 
in practice. 
 
 
                                                             
126 UN Women, “Strategic Plan 2018-2021”, United Nations, New York, NY, 2017, Annex 1 (http://www.unwomen.org/-
/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2017/unw-2017-6-annex1-integrated-results-and-
resources-framework-en.pdf?la=en&vs=2611 ). 
Box 1. UN Trust Fund in Support of Actions to End Violence against Women 
Established in 1996, the trust fund has received more than $6 billion in contributions to prevent 
violence against women, improve survivors’ access to services and enhance law 
implementation. In terms of the governance structure of the trust fund, the Steering 
Committee provides guidance for the trust fund’s strategy and supports the trust fund’s 
outreach. The Global and Regional Programme Advisory Committees advise and support the 
Secretariat, which is in charge of reviewing grant proposals, managing disbursements and 
monitoring programmes. The Administrative Agent is UN Women, which is responsible for the 
legal contract with donors and grant recipients. 
Source: MPTF Office Gateway (n.d.). 
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3.2.2 World Bank Group  
The trust funds set up by the World Bank Group127 are financial agreements aimed at channelling 
voluntary contributions from single or multiple donors to development activities. The World Bank 
Group’s donors encompass national governments, intergovernmental organisations, non-profit 
entities and private companies. The classification of the trust funds follows the fund-specific mode of 
execution. Accordingly, the World Bank Group’s trust funds can be Bank-executed (BETFs), recipient-
executed (RETFs), or they can take the form of financial intermediary funds.128  
BETFs are funds over which the World Bank129 has full spending authority. For this reason, BETFs are 
subject to the policies and procedures that regulate the World Bank’s administrative budget. By 
contrast, RETFs are funds whose implementation is left to the final beneficiary. In these cases, the World 
Bank retains a mere operational function, which involves assessing and overseeing the activities 
funded by the facility. RETFs follow the rules that apply to all financing operations of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Development Association. Finally, 
financial intermediary funds are facilities for which the World Bank plays the role of a financial trustee. 
In this case, the World Bank does not have authority over spending or implementation, thus it cannot 
be held accountable for the use of resources. For this type of trust fund, rules and procedures are 
designed ad hoc.  
If there is willingness on the part of donors to contribute to a new trust fund, the appointed task team 
leader prepares a trust fund proposal, which is cleared and approved internally. In exceptional 
circumstances,130 the proposal may be approved by executive directors or vice presidents. Following 
approval, the World Bank signs legal agreements with the donors and the recipients, and funds are 
called from the donors.131 
During the negotiation phase between the World Bank and the donors, the decision of establishing a 
trust fund by the World Bank is conditional upon the fulfilment of the criteria laid out in Operational 
Policy 14.40.132 Accordingly, the envisaged trust fund must a) be consistent with the World Bank’s 
purposes and mandate, b) be of strategic relevance for the World Bank’s programme, c) ensure sound 
control and risk management, d) guarantee an appropriate level of governance; e) not contain any 
national restriction on procurement, and f) ensure a certain level of operational efficiency and 
sustainability. 
Importantly, donors cannot impose a nationality restriction on procurement, otherwise the World Bank 
would not accept their contribution. This non-discrimination policy can be regarded as a practice for 
                                                             
127 The World Bank Group includes five institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International 
Development Association, International Finance Corporation, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. 
128 See Independent Evaluation Group, “Trust Fund Support for Development: An Evaluation of the World Bank’s Trust Fund 
Portfolio”, World Bank Group, Washington, D.C., 2011, p. 21. See also Toma et al., “2013 Trust Fund Annual Report”, World Bank 
Group, Washington, D.C., 2013, p. 9. 
129 The Bank is made up by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Development 
Association. 
130 Refer to World Bank, “Bank Procedure BP 14.40 Trust Funds (Revised July 2015)”, Washington, D.C., 2015. 
131 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
132 World Bank, “Operational Policy OP 14.40 Trust Funds”, Washington, D.C., 2008. 
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enhancing efficiency and competitiveness, as it does not lead to national preferences when it comes 
to the allocation of resources. 
According to donor officials interviewed by the Independent Evaluation Group,133 donors trust the 
World Bank’s trust funds because of the soundness and integrity of its fiduciary and financial 
management. In particular, staff fulfilment of fiduciary rules is assured by three measures. First, the 
World Bank’s Trust Fund Quality Assurance and Compliance Unit conducts reviews and ensures the 
trust funds’ compliance with the rules. Second, trust fund management staff have to be trained and 
tested on relevant procedures and, third, they must sign a letter of representation every year, 
confirming compliance with the rules and with the internal control system. The World Bank monitors 
the financial performance of its trust funds and reports to donors in terms of disbursements and 
receipts. As explained in Bank Procedure (BP) 14.40,134 external auditors assess whether the World 
Bank’s internal financial control system has been effectively used. Moreover, each recipient’s use of 
trust fund resources is assessed by auditors and then disclosed by the World Bank to the donors. Upon 
request from donors, and in accordance with the legal agreements, the financial statements of an 
individual trust fund may be externally audited.  
In addition to the internal reporting system, the World Bank has a parallel Trust Fund Accountability 
Framework that ensures accountability to donors at both the corporate (e.g. trust fund annual reports 
to donors, grant monitoring system, and quality and compliance reports) and project level (e.g. in-
country committees of donors and inspection visits).135 To get a concrete idea of how accountability is 
ensured in practice, the example of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) is presented.  
The accountability and transparency of the ARTF relies on the trust fund’s Results Management 
Framework, which lays out the procedures for results monitoring and reporting.136 This framework 
envisages different mechanisms for results reporting, at both the fund and project level. Results are 
organised under four pillars, namely country-level outcomes, project and programme-level outcomes, 
the operational effectiveness of projects and trust fund effectiveness in managing resources. 
Performance assessment of the progress towards results in each pillar are published annually in the 
ARTF Scorecard,137 which presents a detailed assessment of performance against some preset 
indicators and targets. The Scorecard links results to the broader development strategy for Afghanistan 
that is laid out in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy and put into action in the National 
Priority Programmes. At the project level, the trust fund reports on implementation by tracking and 
assessing results according to project indicators, in addition to a completion report once the project is 
over.138 
                                                             
133 Ibid., p. 50. 
134 World Bank (2015), op. cit., pp. 4-5. 
135 Independent Evaluation Group (2011), op. cit., p. 49. 
136 World Bank, “ARTF Results Management Framework”, Washington, D.C., 2013. 
137 See the 2016 ARTF Scorecard (http://www.artf.af/images/uploads/home-slider/artf-scorecard-2016-final-web.pdf ). 
138 For a detailed overview of results-reporting mechanisms, refer to Annex 1 of World Bank (2013), op. cit. 
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In addition to internal performance assessment, the ARTF undergoes external review. A monitoring 
agent ensures that all the expenditures of the trust fund are in line with eligibility criteria; assessment 
is carried out also with monitoring visits to project locations. Supervisory agents monitor the physical 
progress of projects, by taking part in inspection visits that assess the quality of work and by reporting 
back to the World Bank and the relevant authorities. All the reports on results mentioned in this section 
are available on the ARTF website, ensuring transparency for donors and the general public. 
 
 
3.3 MEMBER STATES AND THIRD COUNTRIES 
It is rare that a single country creates a trust fund for development actions. Indeed, countries normally 
donate to trust funds administered by the IDO (and EU). There are some exceptions, namely the US, 
which implements very few trust funds (e.g. on technical assistance). Indeed, most of the country’s 
development aid is channelled through bilateral agreements with the recipient or through multilateral 
organisations such as the UN and World Bank. 
However, in the context of multi-donor trust funds, the experience of Member States and third 
countries may be very relevant when it comes to democratic scrutiny. Indeed, IDOs are not subject to 
direct democratic control, since, for instance, the UN and the World Bank have no institutions granting 
citizens’ representation. Nevertheless, democratic scrutiny over the sums allocated by governments to 
IDO-managed initiatives is designed to happen at the national level, before the actual contribution to 
the trust fund takes place.  
Italy is presented as an illustrative example. According to Art. 12 of the Regulation governing the 
operations of the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation,139 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs drafts 
                                                             
139 Italy XVII legislature, Schema di documento triennale di programmazione e di indirizzo della politica di cooperazione allo 
sviluppo riferito agli anni 2015-2017, cui è allegata la relazione sulle attività di cooperazione allo sviluppo, riferita all'anno 2014 
(A.G. 187), Rome, 2015, 10. 
Box 2. Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund 
Since 2002, the ARTF has received more than $9 billion from 33 donors to finance projects in 
education, infrastructure and government capacity. The governance of the ARTF is organised on 
three levels:  
• The Steering Committee decides the strategy of the trust fund and is composed of 
representatives of all donors, the World Bank and the Ministry of Finance. 
• The Management Committee evaluates and approves grant proposals and its members are 
the Ministry of Finance, the Asian Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, UN 
Development Programme and the World Bank. 
• The Administrator of the ARTF is the World Bank, which is in charge of assessing and 
reporting the trust fund’s performance and allocation of funding. 
Source:  The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund.  
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the three-year programme of the Agency, in official consultation with both the relevant parliamentary 
committee and the Ministry of Economy. After being approved by the inter-ministerial committee on 
development, the draft programme is officially authorised by the Council of Ministers.  
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the correct implementation of the development 
programmes in front of the national parliament. Point 4 in Art. 12 requires the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
to complete an annual report on the status of ongoing development programmes supported by the 
Italian Agency for Development Cooperation as well as the programmes implemented through 
international organisations, banks and investment funds. The report must provide quantitative 
indicators, in accordance with the guidelines provided by the OECD’s Development Assistance 
Committee. Thus, in Italy, democratic scrutiny takes place through the accountability of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to the national parliament.  
A second example worth considering is that of the US Agency for International Development (USAID). 
USAID is an independent agency that works in cooperation with the State Department, from which it 
receives foreign policy guidelines. Every year, US foreign operations are scrutinised by Congress in the 
context of the Congressional Budgetary Justification, where USAID explains to Congress the budget 
requested for the following year.  
Additionally, Congress can and does ask USAID to provide reports on different matters, which include 
an annual performance report where the agency presents the progress made in meeting preset 
strategic goals. Indeed, USAID and the State Department establish a four-year Joint Strategic Goal 
Framework that pairs a set of strategic development goals with specific objectives to be achieved by 
the end of the period. In the Annual Performance Report, the agencies evaluate results against a 
number of concrete indicators for each strategic objective. Indicators have pre-established targets for 
each year, making the performance evaluation process simple and transparent.140  
 
3.4 EU BLENDING INSTRUMENTS 
First introduced in the Multiannual Financial Framework 2007–13, blending instruments use EU budget 
grants to mobilise additional resources (loans or equity) from financial institutions (e.g. the European 
Investment Bank and national development banks), and public and private investors. What is the role 
of blending instruments in relation to multi-donor trust funds and to their respective objectives?  
‘Blending’ is inherently different from pure ‘grants’, as the grant element is mainly supporting technical 
assistance or guarantees and risk capital of Financial Institutions to offer debt and equity instruments 
under an acceptable level of risk. Financiers are not donors, but investors (mainly public with a 
mandate) that require the recovery of the loan and associated costs. Thus, the development projects 
financed through blending mechanisms have to be capable of generating enough resources to ensure 
the repayment of the debt.141 The objective of blending instruments is not only to have a development 
impact, but also and especially to attract financing for economically viable projects that would be too 
risky otherwise.  
                                                             
140 For the complete list of key performance indicators, see US Department of State and USAID, “FY 2016 Annual Performance 
Report”, Washington, D.C., 2017. 
141 Jorge Núñez Ferrer et al., “Blending Grants and Loans in the Light of the new DCI”, Study for the European Parliament (PE 
433.784), Brussels, 2012, p. 9. 
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The EU budget contributions to blending instruments fund (as well as additional top-ups by Member 
States to the fund) are non-repayable. Financial institutions using blending instruments’ fund can offer, 
a) investment grants in order to reduce the project’s total cost; b) technical assistance (e.g. project 
preparation and/or supervision, capacity building); c) interest rate subsidies to increase beneficiaries’ 
access to cheap financing; d) guarantees that reduce investment risks by covering potential losses; and 
e) risk capital in the form of equity, loans or quasi-equity.142 
EU blending operations for development purposes are organised under four blending frameworks, 
according to the financing instruments used for disbursing EU funding. The first two frameworks are 
under the responsibility of DG DEVCO, while the others fall under DG NEAR.143  
EU blending facilities, with the exclusion of the Western Balkans Investment Framework, have a 
governance structure based on three levels: a strategic board/steering committee, an operational 
board and a finance institutions group. The steering committee (composed of the European 
Commission, and donor and beneficiary countries) sets the strategy of the facility in line with the 
broader EU development policy for the region, which ensures oversight of the actions of investors. The 
operational board, composed of the European Commission, Member States and other donors, 
evaluates project proposals and approves disbursements. If the grant element is made up of both EU 
budget and Member State contributions, the board has a trust fund manager responsible for it. The 
financial institutions group is composed of representatives of the international financial institutions 
participating in the facility, once they have been accredited by the European Commission. The group 
selects projects to be brought to the operational board for approval.144 
The lead financial institution is in charge not only of the implementation of projects, but also of 
monitoring and reporting operational and financial results. The operational results are monitored in 
terms of project outputs, against benchmarks agreed by the financial institutions and Member States. 
Financial monitoring assesses the leverage effect of the grant, the value of the investment, the balance 
of the fiduciary account and the measurement of losses. Even if the lead financial institution is 
responsible for monitoring, the European Commission is the entity accountable for the use of EU funds, 
and may participate in the oversight of the performance of the blending instrument.145 
Concerning the European Parliament’s oversight of blending instruments, one must refer to Title VIII of 
the Financial Regulation. Art. 140(8) states that the European Commission reports annually to the 
Council and the EP about the activities of financial instruments.146 Information to be disclosed for each 
instrument includes, among other things, budgetary commitments and payments, the investments 
undertaken, the performance of the instrument, an evaluation of the use of the amounts returned to 
the instrument, and the contribution of the instrument to the achievement of preset objectives. The 
EP, as well as the Council, can request a discontinuation of the instrument in the case where it considers 
                                                             
142 European Commission, “Guideline N. 5. Guidelines on EU Blending Operations”, Brussels, 2015(b), p. 9. 
143 The DCI Blending Framework includes the Latin America Investment Facility, Asia Investment Facility, and Investment 
Facility for Central Asia. The Africa Investment Facility, Caribbean Investment Facility and Investment Facility for the Pacific are 
under the umbrella of the EDF Blending Framework. The ENI Blending Framework encompasses the Neighbourhood 
Investment Facility and the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance Blending Framework provides funding to the Western 
Balkans Investment Framework.  
144 See Núñez Ferrer et al. (2012), pp. 24-26, and ECA, “The effectiveness of blending regional investment facility grants with 
financial institution loans to support EU external policies”, Special Report No. 16, Luxembourg, 2014, p. 9. 
145 European Commission (2015b), op. cit., p. 48. 
146 Regulation No. 966/2012, op. cit.  
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that the objectives of the instrument have not been effectively achieved (Art. 140(9) Financial 
Regulation). 
In light of the above, blending is hardly compatible with the preconditions laid out in Art. 187 of the 
Financial Regulation. Indeed, as mentioned in section 1 of the present study, EUTFs must be limited to 
emergency and post-emergency situations, where the conditions for viable and profitable projects are in 
general absent. For this reason, EU blending facilities should not be confused with the EUTFs analysed 
in this study, as the support scheme they provide is extremely different in nature.  
 
3.5 REVIEWING THE TRUST FUNDS AND THE FACILITY FOR REFUGEES IN TURKEY  
This section compares EUTFs with the trust funds of other international development actors, with the 
aim of extracting some ‘promising practices’ from the latter. Trust funds being the subject of this study, 
comparison cannot be made with other forms of development aid instruments. For this reason, 
bilateral aid is not assessed as it follows completely different procedures. The bilateral aid, such as that 
of Italy or USAID discussed above (see section 3.3), is subject to national democratic oversight, which 
cannot be achieved in the case of multi-donor trust funds. Thus, the focus will be on the United Nations 
and the World Bank, both of which have a long history of setting up and managing multi-donor trust 
funds. 
While it is possible to compare the governance and practices of trust funds between the EU and these 
international institutions, one has to keep in mind the existence of major differences. First, UN and 
World Bank trust funds receive contributions from a much larger number of donors compared with 
EUTFs. Second, the UN and World Bank systems do not envisage democratic accountability through an 
elected supranational parliament. Indeed, within these systems a supranational democratic body 
comparable to the European Parliament is simply not present. Democratic scrutiny is not carried out at 
the trust fund level, but at a national level, before the donation is transferred. National parliaments are 
in charge of this process.  
The EU channels large amounts of funding to trust funds managed by the UN and the World Bank. It is 
entitled to monitor and assess the use made by the two international organisations. The cooperation 
between the EU and the UN is regulated by the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement, 
the latest version of which entered into force in 2014.147 The contractual relationship with the World 
Bank is laid out in the Framework Agreement signed in 2009.148  
In the context of these two agreements, the EU can monitor and check whether its funding is used as 
agreed. According to the Financial Regulation, the European Commission checks whether the UN and 
World Bank control systems comply with international standards in the following fields: procurement, 
external audit, internal control, accounting, grants and financial instruments. The European 
Commission and the ECA have the mandate to carry out audits to check the way funds are used. 
However, these assessments can be only done on the global budget as it is impossible to separate EU-
donated funds from others, since earmarking is not permitted. At the same time, the EU can ask the UN 
or World Bank to report on specific issues only ex post, when the regular results reporting is not deemed 
                                                             
147 Available online at https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/45445. 
148 See https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/funding/procedures-beneficiary-countries-and-partners/fafa-world-bank_en. 
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sufficient.149 Similarly, interviewees in the scope of this study expressed concerns about the visibility of 
EU funding when it goes through the UN or World Bank funds.150  
Both the World Bank and the EU stipulate a number of criteria that have to be met by a potential trust 
fund. These criteria were mentioned in section 2.1 for the EU and in section 3.2.2 for the World Bank. 
Both actors stress the importance of strategic relevance, efficiency, avoiding duplication and sound risk 
management. However, one the of World Bank’s criteria is the rejection of nationality restrictions on 
procurement, meaning that contributions cannot be accepted if they come along with a nationality 
imposition. With the exception of the Madad Fund, the EUTFs state in their constitutive agreements 
that implementation by EU Member States or other trust fund donors is to be preferred (see section 
2.2). It can be argued that the imposition of national preferences undermines efficiency, as the 
competitive process for the selection of implementing partners is biased. Although the EUTFs do not 
allow for nationality restrictions either, their a priori preference for national implementing structures 
(although not specifying which national structures, of course) can be seen as impeding a selection 
process that is as open as possible to arrive at the most cost-effective and capable implementing 
partner. 
Trust funds’ governance structures differ. The EUTFs have a two-level structure, with the Trust Fund 
Board in charge of the strategy of the trust fund and the Operational Committee in charge of 
operations. The decision of allocation and disbursement of funding to projects is taken by the EUTF 
Operational Committee, where the European Commission and the donors have voting rights (see 
section 2.1). The proposed governance structure of UN trust funds, although not binding, sees one 
major body, the steering committee, which is in charge of both the strategy of the trust fund, the 
allocation of resources and the selection of projects (see subsection 3.2.1). The actual disbursement is 
then made by the administrative agent, which also signs a legal agreement and evaluates the trust 
fund’s performance.  
Concerning accountability of trust fund operations, one can identify two promising practices: one from 
the results monitoring and reporting framework of the ARTF managed by the World Bank, and one 
from the UN MPTF Office. 
The ARTF has put in place an extensive results-management framework that classifies expected 
outcomes according to the trust fund’s objectives. A detailed performance assessment is published 
regularly in a selection of formats ensuring transparency and holding the trust fund and the World Bank 
accountable for their operations. As mentioned in subsection 2.4.1 above, by comparison EUTFs are 
less organised when it comes to results monitoring and reporting. At the time of writing, some EUTFs 
do not have a results-monitoring framework in place, while those that have one may not clearly report 
on progress made to meet the indicators laid out in their own framework. Of course, when comparing 
EUTFs with the ARTF one has to consider that the latter was set up in 2002, thus having much more 
time to improve results-monitoring and performance-assessing frameworks. The example of the ARTF 
could be considered a promising structure with which EUTFs could potentially align.  
From the UN, a promising practice for improving accountability is the existence of a managing actor, 
the MPTF Office, which manages approximately 95% of all the UN’s multi-donor trust funds. The 
presence of an office that administers all trust funds enhances efficiency, as it provides a consistent 
                                                             
149 European Commission (2016d), op. cit., pp. 4–5. 
150 Interview Nos 1, 19, 20 and 22, European Commission, November–December, 2017.  
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approach across trust funds and allows the proliferation and communication of best practices. 
Additionally, the MPTF Office has a public online platform, called the “MPTF Office Gateway”, with a 
page dedicated to each trust fund where information about the governance structure, donors, 
contributions and disbursements to projects is listed. A single, exhaustive online platform is good for 
transparency purposes.  
By contrast, information about EUTFs in not collected in a single platform. Rather, each trust fund has 
a page on the Commission’s website where information is displayed in a non-consistent manner. The 
Commission could thus envisage setting up a similar office and gateway to further increase efficiency, 
coherence and transparency, as well as a dedicated website for each trust fund where all relevant 
reporting is published, including performance assessments.  
 
4. GENERAL RESULTS AND POLICY CONSEQUENCES 
4.1 QUANTITATIVE OVERVIEW 
This section provides an account of the implementation status of the four EUTFs and the FRT that are 
the subject of this study. By drawing from the latest publicly available data on funded projects 
(published in annual reports or in separate updates), this part of the study presents a snapshot of how 
the trust funds’ resources have been disbursed so far. The analysis is developed on two levels: one looks 
at the types of implementing partner to whom projects are awarded, while the other assesses the areas 
of intervention where funding is channelled.151  
One can identify five types of project partners: (i) IDOs such as the World Bank and the UN; (ii) national 
organisations (including national promotional banks, national development agencies and national 
ministries); (iii) NGOs; (iv) academic organisations and (v) private companies.152 From the published 
accounts of projects funded by the trust funds, the listed implementing partners are categorised 
among the five above-mentioned types. 
Also for the sake of comparison, we classify projects’ areas of intervention into some general sectors: 
health and healthcare, education, technical assistance, socioeconomic support, food security, 
reconciliation, gender issues, urban rehabilitation, basic social services, environmental protection, 
migration management and humanitarian assistance. This classification reflects the information 
provided in the publicly available lists of projects, with some rearrangements made by the authors. 
Examples of projects that provide socioeconomic support include easier access to financing for 
economic recovery, support for local populations affected by an influx of refugees and support for the 
creation of employment opportunities. Projects implemented under the EU Emergency Trust Fund for 
Africa are not categorised within these sectors because the published list of funded projects in the 
fund’s 2016 Annual Report153 classifies projects by the specific objectives they serve, a structure we 
replicate here.  
                                                             
151 The computations presented in this section are based on a technical annex (Excel file) that is not part of this report. 
152 This classification has been created by the authors of this study in order to summarise the different actors in a comparable 
way. 
153 European Commission (2017b), op. cit., Annex 1. 
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4.1.1 Bêkou Trust Fund 
Implementing partners 
This trust fund’s pledged contributions amount to EUR 233 million, of which EUR 86 million have been 
received. Resources come from the EU budget, the EDF (which accounts for half of the pledged 
contributions) and some Member States, namely Germany, France, the Netherlands, Italy and 
Switzerland.154 As of the end of 2016, the trust fund had granted EUR 71 million to 31 projects in the 
Central African Republic. The average contract duration is 19.3 months, while the average grant per 
project is EUR 2.3 million.  
As presented in Figure 4, the large majority of the trust fund’s resources (EUR 44 million or 62%) is 
granted to projects implemented by NGOs. Member States’ bilateral agencies (represented in the 
category of national organisations) manage projects worth EUR 24 million, followed by IDOs (EUR 2.2 
million) and private companies (EUR 1 million). NGOs dominate also in terms of the number of projects 
run: 22 projects out of 31, i.e. 71%.155 
Figure 4. Bêkou Trust Fund – Allocation by partner type (EUR  million)  
 
Note: As of 31 December 2016. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ECA, “The Bêkou EU Trust Fund for the Central African Republic: A Hopeful 
Beginning despite Some Shortcomings”, Special Report No. 11/2017, Luxembourg, 2017(a), Annex 1. 
 
Areas of intervention 
Projects are implemented in a variety of areas of intervention. Figure 5 shows the breakdown by sector 
in terms of the value of disbursement – expressed also as a percentage of the total and number of 
projects. Fourteen projects operate in healthcare improvement, with a total value of EUR 27 million 
(38%). Urban rehabilitation is addressed by two projects that have disbursed EUR 16 million of funding 
                                                             
154 European Parliament (2017), op. cit., p. 30. 
155 ECA (2017a), op. cit., Annex 1. 
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(23%). Two projects provide socioeconomic support (EUR 12 million, 17%), e.g. improving the 
management of forestry resources. Other minor areas of intervention are food security, reconciliation, 
environmental protection and gender issues.  
Figure 5. Bêkou Trust Fund – Allocation by sector (EUR  million, percentage of total funding, and 
number of projects)  
 
Note: As of 31 December 2016. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ECA, “The Bêkou EU Trust Fund for the Central African Republic: A Hopeful 
Beginning despite Some Shortcomings”, Special Report No. 11/2017, Luxembourg, 2017(a), Annex 1. 
 
Case study: The Central African Republic 
In 2013, a political and security crisis broke out in the Central African Republic, leaving large parts of 
the population in distress, internally displaced or seeking refuge abroad. The country had no formal 
government in place, making impossible the provision of aid through formal instruments, e.g. the EDF. 
To provide aid, support and help in stabilising the country, in July 2014 the European Commission, 
together with France, Germany and the Netherlands, established the Bêkou Trust Fund, which is the 
first EU multi-donor trust fund. Subsequently, also Italy and Switzerland became donors to the trust 
fund. 
In 2017, following a partial de-escalation of violence and the regular election of a government, the EU 
started a National Indicative Programme funded under the 11th EDF. Through the National Indicative 
Programme, the EU has pledged EUR 327 million in three areas of priority: economic and social 
governance, security and democracy, and resilience.156 The funding dedicated to strengthening 
                                                             
156 European Commission, “Programme Indicatif National pour la période 2014-2020 pour la République Centrafricaine”, 
Brussels, 2017(g). 
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resilience will be channelled through the Bêkou Trust Fund, which remains complementary to the 
newly created National Indicative Programme.157 
As laid out in Art. 2 of the Constitutive Agreement, the objectives of the Bêkou Trust Fund are to 
“provide consistent, targeted aid for the resilience of vulnerable groups and support for all aspects of 
the Central African Republic’s exit from the crisis and reconstruction, to coordinate actions over the 
short, medium and long term and to help neighbouring countries cope with the consequences of the 
crisis”. Actions taken range from the provision of basic public and social services, e.g. access to water, 
electricity and education, to administrative capacity building and reconciliation efforts. In addition, the 
trust fund aims at helping neighbouring countries in coping with the influx of refugees from the Central 
African Republic.  
Areas of intervention 
Already briefly discussed above in this section, the projects financed by the trust fund are described 
more in detail here. While in Figure 5 above projects were categorised according to a sectoral allocation 
that was commonly applied to all the EUTFs, here the categorisation follows the original categorisation 
that is mentioned in the published list of projects. For example, projects that in Figure 5 above were in 
the category of socioeconomic support, in this section are divided into two priorities: refugees and 
economic recovery. This gives more specificity on the funded areas of intervention. 
Figure 6 presents the areas of intervention of the 31 projects financed by the Bêkou Trust Fund as of 
the end of 2016. As a new Operational Committee meeting was expected to take place in December 
2017, new projects are likely to be contracted soon. For each project priority the amount of resources 
disbursed is displayed in both absolute and percentage values. Fourteen projects, cumulatively worth 
EUR 26.6 million operate in the healthcare sector and are all awarded to NGOs. In particular, eight 
projects provide support to strengthen and improve healthcare facilities in different regions of the 
country, four projects provide medical and nutritional assistance to the population and two projects 
are more of a technical nature. Urban rehabilitation programmes (EUR 16 million, two projects) aim at 
improving the economic and social reconstruction of urban areas and are implemented by Member 
State bilateral agencies. Measures to ease access to financing are worth EUR 7.5 million and aim at 
stimulating economic recovery. 
A project worth EUR 4.4 million undertakes actions in support of Central African Republic refugees in 
Cameroon and host communities. It is estimated that 11,400 refugees and 5,000 people from hosting 
villages have received direct benefit from the actions, plus a number of indirect beneficiaries.158 Food 
security is addressed by eight projects that implement vaccination campaigns and provide seeds and 
tools to farmers (EUR 5.9 million). The partners for these projects are NGOs and two international 
organisations. Reconciliation efforts are financed by three projects that provide local services and 
support, e.g. to a radio station for a total amount of EUR 5.2 million. NGOs manage projects for both 
environmental protection (EUR 3.8 million) and support for women (EUR 1.4 million) through the 
creation of value-generating activities and literacy campaigns.  
                                                             
157 Interview Nos 14 and 15, European Commission DG DEVCO, November 2017. 
158 European Parliament (2017), op. cit., p. 18. 
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Figure 6. Bêkou Trust Fund – Project priorities (EUR  million)  
 
Note: As of 31 December 2016. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ECA, “The Bêkou EU Trust Fund for the Central African Republic: A Hopeful 
Beginning despite Some Shortcomings”, Special Report No. 11/2017, Luxembourg, 2017(a), Annex 1. 
 
Implementing partners 
As noted above, NGOs are awarded the majority of the allocated funding (EUR 44 million out of EUR 71 
million), followed by Member State bilateral agencies (EUR 24 million), IDOs (EUR 2 million) and private 
companies (EUR 1 million). However, once we take the number of projects into account, the picture 
shows clearly that Member State bilateral agencies are the implementing partners of the largest 
projects, while NGOs are awarded smaller ones. Indeed, Member State bilateral agencies, e.g. KfW and 
AdF, manage projects worth much more than the average (Table 3).  
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Table 3. Bêkou Trust Fund project allocation  
ORGANISATION NUMBER OF 
PROJECTS 
TOTAL FUNDING  
(EUR  MILLION) 
AVERAGE VALUE 
PER PROJECT 
(EUR  MILLION) 
International development organisations 2 2 1 
Non-governmental organisations 22 44 2 
Private companies 3 1 0.3 
Member State bilateral agencies 4 24 6 
Total 31 71 2.3 
Note: As of 31 December 2016. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ECA, “The Bêkou EU Trust Fund for the Central African Republic: A Hopeful 
Beginning despite Some Shortcomings”, Special Report No. 11/2017, Luxembourg, 2017(a), Annex 1. 
 
This situation reflects the considerations expressed by the ECA159 that mention the presence of conflicts 
of interest in the Operational Committee, where Member States are represented by their own national 
development agencies, which in turn are selected as project implementers.160 
4.1.2 Madad Fund  
As of October 2017, the Operational Board of the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian 
Crisis had allocated EUR 1 billion to projects. Moreover, EUR 511 million had been contracted to project 
partners and EUR 244 million had already been disbursed across 25 projects. The average duration of 
financed projects is 27.8 months, while the average financing commitment per project amounts to EUR 
20.6 million. At present, the average disbursement per project is EUR 9.8 million. Among the projects, 
60% (15) are cross-border initiatives.  
Implementing partners 
As presented in Figure 7, national organisations have been awarded the largest share of the Madad 
Fund projects, namely EUR 191.5 million. These include the German, Italian and French national 
agencies for international cooperation (EUR 114 million in total), the German national promotional 
bank (KfW), which was awarded a project worth EUR 70 million, and the Serbian Ministry of 
Employment with a project valued at EUR 7.3 million. IDOs, which encompass different UN agencies 
and the World Bank, have been awarded projects worth in total EUR 162.5 million. The value of projects 
implemented by NGOs is EUR 134.4 million. Finally, two German academic organisations are 
implementing two projects worth EUR 23 million in total. 
  
                                                             
159 ECA (2017a), op. cit., pp. 23-24. 
160 Interview Nos 14 and 15, Commission DG DEVCO, November 2017. 
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Figure 7. Madad Trust Fund – Contracted amounts by partner type (EUR  million) 
 
Note: As of 19 October 2017. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on European Commission, “The EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the 
Syrian Crisis: Projects contracted – Status 19/10/2017”, Brussels, 2017(h). 
 
To give a more detailed picture, one also needs to attribute weight to the number of projects 
implemented by each partner type, by computing the average project value. National organisations 
manage six projects that are worth on average EUR 32 million. IDOs manage eight projects worth on 
average EUR 20.3 million. NGOs implement the largest number of projects, i.e. nine, but their average 
value is only EUR 15 million.  
Areas of intervention 
Regarding the sectoral coverage (Figure 8), the largest number of projects have been approved in the 
field of education (eight projects for a total allocation of EUR 238 million), dealing with both education 
and child protection as well as higher education. Seven multi-sectoral projects (EUR 69 million) address 
fundamental social needs and aim at improving living conditions of both Syrian refugees and local host 
communities. Three projects (EUR 70 million) focus on healthcare while two projects (EUR 78 million) 
provide socioeconomic support. Furthermore, three projects (EUR 46 million) are of a more technical 
nature and deal with the restoration of basic infrastructure, such as the water sanitation facilities.  
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Figure 8. Madad Trust Fund – Contracted amounts by sector (EUR  million, percentage of total 
funding, and number of projects)  
 
Note: As of 19 October 2017. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on European Commission, “The EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the 
Syrian Crisis: Projects contracted – Status 19/10/2017”, Brussels, 2017(h). 
 
4.1.3 EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey 
The FRT has committed EUR 2.9 billion to humanitarian and non-humanitarian projects on the ground. 
Of these, as of 20 October 2017, EUR 1.69 billion had been contracted and EUR 899 million had been 
disbursed. The analysis in this section will refer to committed amounts, a part of which (EUR 698 million) 
will not be considered because it has not yet been allocated and is waiting for project proposals to be 
submitted. This analysis will thus concern the EUR 2.2 billion of committed resources that have already 
been allocated.  
Implementing partners 
National organisations represent the largest partner type in terms of project values. This category 
includes government agencies, i.e. the Turkish Ministries for Health and Education, which implement 
three large projects with a total value of EUR 660 million, and national promotional banks, namely 
Germany’s KfW and France’s AdF (total project value EUR 295 million). IDOs implement eighteen 
8
2 3 7
3
1 1
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
 -
 50
 100
 150
 200
 250
 300
Education Socioeconomic
Support
Health and
Healthcare
Multisectoral-
basic social
services
Technical Food Security EUTF
contribution to
the GCFF
Madad Trust Fund 
Allocation per Sector 
EUR  Million, Number of Projects, Percentage allocation
Total Amount (€ million) Share
Policy Department D: Budgetary Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
62 
projects worth EUR 840 million in total.161 NGOs manage twenty-nine smaller projects, for a cumulative 
worth of EUR 410 million (Figure 9). It is of course evident that national organisations are also involved 
in the projects they do not implement, such as the involvement of the Turkish Coast Guard under a 
project implemented by the International Organization for Migration.162 
Figure 9. EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey – Committed amounts by partner type (EUR  million) 
 
Note: As of 20 October 2017. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on European Commission, “EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey: Projects 
committed/decided, contracted, disbursed – Status on 20/10/2017”, Brussels, 2017(f). 
 
Areas of intervention 
Figure 10 below shows the sectoral allocation of projects across the humanitarian (left hand side of the 
graph) and non-humanitarian envelopes (right hand side of the graph).  The amount committed in the 
humanitarian envelope accounts for EUR 1.3 billion, whose only EUR 617.8 million have been already 
allocated. Regarding the sectoral distribution of the funds assigned for humanitarian actions, almost 
EUR 400 million has been allocated to twelve multi-sectoral projects, aiming at providing different basic 
social services. Around EUR 70 million has been allocated to nine humanitarian assistance protection 
projects, and a similar amount has been assigned to fifteen projects on healthcare. Finally, EUR 40 
million has been allocated to one project providing socio-economic support, and EUR 37 million has 
been committed to two projects on education.  
                                                             
161 Of these, the UNFPA manages three projects, the IOM manages three projects, the World Bank manages three projects, 
Unicef manages two projects, WFP manages two projects, WHO manages two projects, UNHCR manages one project, Council 
of Europe Development Bank manages one project, and the European Investment Bank manages one project.  
162 See https://www.iom.int/news/eur-20-million-eu-project-support-turkish-coast-guard-seeks-save-more-migrant-lives.  
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The amount committed in the non-humanitarian envelope amounts to EUR 1.6 billion, which is 
composed by fewer but significantly larger projects. In this regard, EUR 545 million has been committed 
across three projects related to education. EUR 380 million has been allocated to three projects on 
healthcare, while EUR 307 million has been committed to two multi-sectoral projects. EUR 200 million 
has been allocated to technical assistance projects, while EUR 80 and EUR 75 million have been 
allocated respectively to two migration management and three socio economic support projects.  
Figure 10. EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey – Committed amounts by sector (EUR  million, 
percentage of total funding, and number of projects)  
 
Note: As of 20 October 2017. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on European Commission, “EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey: Projects 
committed/decided, contracted, disbursed – Status on 20/10/2017”, Brussels, 2017(f). 
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4.1.4 EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa  
The pledged funding for the activities of this trust fund amount to EUR 3.16 billion, with the majority 
(EUR 2.3 billion) coming from the EDF. Other contributors include the EU budget, some Member States, 
Norway and Switzerland.163 As of the end of 2016, the trust fund had approved 183 projects for a 
cumulative worth of EUR 1.6 billion. Of these, EUR 64.5 million had been allocated to the North Africa 
window, EUR 606 million to the Horn of Africa window and EUR 918.5 million to the Sahel and Lake 
Chad window.  
Implementing partners 
The largest partner type is represented by national organisations, which were awarded 73 projects for 
a total value of EUR 726 million (Figure 11). This category includes national development agencies (54 
projects with a value of EUR 516 million), national ministries and bilateral agencies. IDOs and NGOs 
each manage approximately 21% of the total funding (55 and 33 projects respectively). Private 
companies, whose names are not disclosed, carry out 7 projects worth EUR 48 million. The category 
‘other’ includes implementing partners to be defined and those who were not disclosed. 
Figure 11. EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa – Allocation by partner type (EUR  million)* 
 
Notes: As of 31 December 2016.  
* Due to statistical approximation in the source document, the sum of the amounts allocated to the projects that 
have been classified for this study does not match with the total reported in the source document. The difference 
is about 1% of the total amount. 
* *The colour green indicated in the legend for academic organisations amounts to - EUR 4.1 million. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on European Commission, “2016 Annual Report – The Emergency Trust Fund 
for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa”, Brussels, 2017(b), 
Annex 1. 
                                                             
163 European Parliament (2017), op. cit., p. 28. 
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Objectives of intervention 
Interventions financed by the EUTF for Africa have five major objectives (Figure 12). The largest amount 
of resources is set aside for strengthening resilience (EUR 508 million for 38 projects). Approximately 
EUR 317 million is devoted to creating economic and employment opportunities (33 projects), 
improving ‘migration management’ has received EUR 281 million in funding for 58 projects, while 20 
projects for improving governance have a cumulative value of EUR 278 million. Among the 
programmes, 31 have multiple objectives. 
Figure 12. EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa – Allocation by objective (EUR  million, percentage 
of total funding, and number of projects)  
 
Note: As of 31 December 2016. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on European Commission, “2016 Annual Report – The Emergency Trust Fund 
for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa”, Brussels, 2017(b), 
Annex 1. 
 
  
38
33
58 20
31
3
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Strengthening
Resilience
Greater
economic and
employment
opportunities
Improving
migration
management
Improved
governance
Cross cutting Other
EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa
Allocation per Objective
EUR Million, Number of Projects, Percentage allocation
€ Million %
Policy Department D: Budgetary Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
66 
Case study: Ethiopia 
Ethiopia receives the largest amount of funding under the Horn of Africa window of the EUTF for Africa. 
At the time of writing (October 2017), a total amount of EUR 115 million had been or was in the process 
of being contracted for Ethiopia under the trust fund.164 The main programmes currently approved and 
in contracting phases are illustrated in Table 4.  
Table 4. EUTF Africa programmes in Ethiopia  
NAME CONTRACTING 
TYPE 
CONTRACTING ENTITY MILLION 
EUR  
Ethiopia Resilience Building 
and Creation of Economic 
Opportunities (RESET II) 
Invitation to 
submit 
proposals for 
grants 
ACF, IDE UK, CORDAID, CARE NL, 
Dan Church Aid, VITA, Save the 
Children UK, Oxfam GB  
44 
Stemming Irregular Migration 
in Northern and Central 
Ethiopia (SINCE) 
Delegated 
agreement, 
invitation to 
submit 
proposals for 
grants 
Directorate-General for 
Development Cooperation, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
International Cooperation, Italy, 
including service contracts with 
ILO/UNIDO 
19.845 
Regional Development and 
Protection Programme in 
Ethiopia (RDPP) 
Invitation to 
submit 
proposals for 
grants 
IRC, NRC, Save the Children 
Fund, Dan Church Aid, Plan 
Foundation Netherlands 
29.3 
Better Resilience to Impacts of 
El Niño through Integrated 
Complementary Actions to the 
EU Resilience Building 
Programme in Ethiopia (RESET 
Plus) 
Direct 
agreement 
through 
negotiation, 
call for 
proposals 
Unicef, other organisations 
(selection in process) 
22.3 
  TOTAL 115.445 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
Some of these programmes, notably the Regional Development and Protection Programme in Ethiopia 
(RDPP) and RESET, had already been in development before the launch of the EUTF for Africa, with the 
latter providing a funding opportunity to speed up their introduction. In addition to the programmes 
in this table, Ethiopia benefits from the EUTF for Africa’s regional programmes, such as the “Better 
Migration Management” project and the upcoming “Collaboration in Cross-Border Areas” project.165 
There is the possibility to have more programmes approved for Ethiopia, depending on decisions by 
the Horn of Africa Operational Committee. More support could possibly be foreseen in those future 
decisions for the Ethiopian Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs as well as more 
programmes to focus on stability in the country and the region.166 It goes without saying that these 
                                                             
164 See https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/october_-2017-hoa-contract_status_overview-update-ethiopia_en.pdf. 
165 See https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/october_-2017-hoa-contract_status_overview-update-regional_en.pdf. 
166 Interview Nos 2 and 3, Commission, DG DEVCO, October 2017, and No. 13, EEAS, November 2017. 
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amounts do of course come on top of the regular EDF funding for Ethiopia under the National 
Indicative Programme.167  
This EUTF for Africa funding for Ethiopia arrives in a wider context of EU–Ethiopian cooperation, on 
both migration affairs and other priorities, such as economic development, human rights and 
economic development. On the ‘migration file’ specifically, the EU concluded a Common Agenda on 
Migration and Mobility (CAMM) with Ethiopia on 11 November 2015, i.e. alongside the Valetta Summit. 
This CAMM is a policy instrument under the EU’s Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM).168 
It essentially consists of a political (non-legally binding) declaration at the highest political level, 
containing a commitment to cooperate across the four GAMM pillars: i) legal migration, ii) irregular 
migration & smuggling and trafficking, iii) migration and development, and iv) international 
protection.169 As CAMMs do not qualify as ‘international agreements’ in light of the Lisbon Treaty, they 
equally escape democratic scrutiny and consent by the European Parliament. Ethiopia is also an active 
Steering Committee member of the ‘Khartoum’ process, a dialogue and platform between the EU and 
a number of African countries stretching up from the Horn of Africa and also including Egypt, Libya and 
Tunisia.170  
The EU also earmarked Ethiopia as one of the five priority countries for a ‘compact’ under the EU 
Partnership Framework, issued in the form of a Commission Communication in June 2016.171 This forms 
part of the EU’s Agenda on Migration.172 However, the ‘compact’ for Ethiopia is neither a publicly 
accessible document, nor has it been formally presented to or negotiated with the Ethiopian 
government. Hence, the EU ‘compact’ with Ethiopia remains a term that is referred to, but it is rather 
an empty shell and thus far void of concrete substance, let alone agreement, in EU–Ethiopian 
cooperation on migration.  
Nevertheless, at the overall level, the EU Partnership Framework and the actions under the EUTF for 
Africa are explicitly linked, with the EUTF meant to “play an important role in the implementation of 
the Partnership Framework”.173 One of the objectives of the Partnership Framework is to curb irregular 
migration and to enhance the cooperation with third countries on return and readmission.  
The “SINCE” is a project on irregular migration, initiated and implemented by the Italian government. 
It is still in the phase of contracting and calling for proposals, despite the fact that it was among the first 
projects approved by the Operational Committee for the Horn of Africa window. Its aims, however, are 
mostly related to a ‘root causes’ logic of reducing irregular migration, i.e. relating to enhancing 
livelihoods and facilitating entrepreneurship.174 
Readmission also proves to be among the major issues in the cooperation with Ethiopia. This is true in 
terms of the priority given to it by the EU Member States and (some parts of) the European Commission, 
                                                             
167 National Indicative Programme for Ethiopia – 2014 to 2020, Ref. Ares(2014)2070433, European Commission and Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Nairobi, 24 June 2014. 
168 European Commission, “The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility", COM(2011) 743 Final, Brussels, 2011. 
169 Joint Declaration on a Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
and the European Union and Its Member States, Valetta, 2015. 
170 See https://www.khartoumprocess.net/about/actors-and-governance. 
171 European Commission (2016c), op. cit. 
172 European Commission, Communication, "A European Agenda on Migration”, COM(2015), 240 final, Brussels, 2015(a). 
173 European Commission (2017b), op. cit., p. 4. 
174 European Commission, “Action Document for the Implementation of the Horn of Africa Window (T05–EUTF–HoA– ET-02) 
– Stemming Irregular Migration in Northern & Central Ethiopia – SINCE”, Brussels, 2016(a). 
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as well as in terms of Ethiopia’s hesitance to agree to more cooperation in this field. Although the 
projects included in Table 3 above do not explicitly aim at this priority, at the policy level there is a 
more-for-more approach between the potential projects for Ethiopia under the EUTF for Africa and its 
cooperation in the field of readmission. At the time of writing, cooperation on this issue remains 
difficult, although an instrument other than a formal EU readmission agreement (a type of protocol) 
could perhaps be envisaged, potentially followed up by further EUTF for Africa projects for Ethiopia.175 
Yet so far, the actual workings of more for more can be doubted in this case study: although Ethiopia 
is, as noted above, the main beneficiary country under the EUTF Horn of Africa window, its “return rate” 
is noted by the Commission to be “one of the lowest in the region”.176  
In light of the fact that Ethiopia is dealing with a major crisis of displacement of refugees, dwarfing the 
numbers of potential Ethiopian returnees from the EU, the EUTF for Africa funding aims at also 
reinforcing the Ethiopian capacities to deal with this challenge. In particular, the RDPP in Ethiopia (part 
of a wider regional RDPP programme in the Horn of Africa) addresses a number of needs in this area, 
particularly of Eritrean and Somali refugees. The RDPP aims to increase social cohesion, improve 
livelihoods (including employment), enhance protection and support capacity building at the local 
level.177 
This brief case study on the EUTF for Africa’s activities in Ethiopia shows that the EUTF for Africa has 
been the impetus for bringing about more projects relatively quickly, albeit (so far) mostly projects that 
had already been under development before the EUTF for Africa’s launch. The SINCE project is a clear 
outlier when it comes to ‘speed’, challenging (in this case) the assumption that the Member States’ 
privileged implementing role under the EUTF for Africa contributes to its speedy delivery. This brief 
overview also emphasises the overall nature of the EUTF for Africa, namely driven by controversial 
policy choices, where traditional programming (as is known under the EDF) is partly replaced by non-
democratic ‘policy judgment’ on priorities to be pursued and projects to be approved.  
It underlines the need to analyse the EUTF for Africa in the overall EU foreign policy frameworks and 
instruments designed for external migration and development policies, where the European 
Parliament should – following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty – be a central player and inter-
institutional actor. Moreover, the frequent use of open calls for proposals in this case is somewhat 
exceptional for the EUTF for Africa, but it goes to show that this type of contracting is not necessarily 
at odds with the speed and flexibility demanded from an EUTF.  
  
                                                             
175 Interview Nos 2 and 3, Commission, DG DEVCO, October 2017, and No. 13, EEAS, November 2017. 
176 European Commission, “Fifth Progress Report on the Partnership Framework with Third Countries under the European 
Agenda on Migration", COM(2017) 471 Final, Brussels, 2017(c), p. 7. 
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4.1.5 EU Trust Fund for Colombia 
Given its very recent foundation, the EUTF for Colombia has just started four projects, but largely is still 
in the phase of calling for project proposals.178 The EUTF for Colombia was established in December 
2016. At present, the trust fund has pledged contributions worth EUR 95 million, and of this amount, 
EUR 24 million has been received. Donors include the EU budget (EUR 72 million pledged) and 19 EU 
Member States (EUR 23 million).179 As for the EU budget, EUR 70 million was transferred from the DCI 
by DG DEVCO and EUR 2 million from DG ECHO. Out of 19 Member States only 7 have reached the EUR 
3 million threshold, namely Spain, Sweden, France and Germany, plus a few others. Interviews 
conducted for the purpose of this study revealed that 10 Member States decided to join the EUTF 
Colombia after the first negative result from the referendum, where the majority of people who voted 
were against the Peace Agreement with FARC ex-combatants. Thus, Member States decided to join the 
fund even with a symbolic contribution so as to give political weight and to show support for the 
Colombian government to implement the Peace Agreement.180 Even though the Member States’ 
contributions varied greatly, it was agreed that in both the Strategic and Operational Committees, 
decisions will be taken by consensus. This was done as part of showing the added value of greater 
involvement particularly of smaller or newer EU Member States.  
The Colombian government is seen as an active partner of this EUTF. It is invited to the EUTF strategic 
and operational meetings. The Colombian government does not have official voting rights, but it can 
veto the projects it disagrees with. The involvement of the Colombian government also helps to 
prevent various kinds of overlaps with the UN, World Bank and International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD) or third-country funds, such as the USAID. The EUTF therefore is tasked with 
‘rural development’ in the regions that were most affected by the conflict. Also, the EUTF is tasked with 
helping to reintegrate the ex-combatants of FARC into socioeconomic life. Interestingly, it was decided 
to hold Operational Committee meetings in Colombia – at the EU Delegation in Bogota. On the one 
hand, this decision has enabled the better involvement of the Colombian government and other 
international aid organisations working on the ground (as observers), but on the other hand it makes 
democratic accountability to the European Parliament more difficult. 
Among the EU Member States, Spain was the most active in proposing the EUTF for Colombia. This may 
be due to closer historical links between these regions. The EUTF was officially proposed by the EU 
Delegation in Bogota and by the Spanish government. Interviews highlighted that among other 
reasons, funding foreseen for the 2014–17 Multiannual Financial Framework was reduced because DG 
DEVCO was aiming to withdraw after 2017 from the medium-income countries in the Andes region, 
such as Colombia, Peru and Ecuador.181 National development cooperation and aid agencies of Spain 
and other major donors were also active in Colombia prior the Peace Agreement via the DCI and other 
funds. Sweden was said to contribute not only to the EUTF, but also to all other multi-donor funds of 
the UN, the World Bank and IBRD.  
Different committees and bodies within the EP have expressed their interest in this new fund. First of 
all, in November 2016 DG DEVCO, which is in the lead, was invited to present the EUTF at the meeting 
of the European Parliament's Delegation for relations with the countries of the Andean Community. 
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180 Interview Nos 21 and 22, European Commission, December, 2017. 
181 Ibid. 
Policy Department D: Budgetary Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
70 
Just after its establishment, in January 2017, the EP DEVE Committee also raised questions about the 
Colombia EUTF. As mentioned above, on 4 December 2017 DG DEVCO representative Stefano 
Manservisi was invited to the EP Committee on Budgetary Control to share information about all the 
EUTFs, including the EUTF for Colombia.  
As a ‘promising practice’, since June 2017 it was also agreed to invite relevant EP committees, namely 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Development, to the strategic meetings. 
Nevertheless, one of the meetings was exceptionally held in Bogota and according to interviewees, the 
EP representatives were also invited to attend that meeting in person. MEPs could not attend the event 
in Bogota and a video-conferencing alternative was not feasible at that time, according to the 
interviewees.182 At the time of writing, four projects have already started and several are being 
contracted.183 The ongoing projects focus on integrated rural development in 4 of the most conflict affected 
areas – Meta, Cauca, Choco, Valle del Cauca for a total EUTF contribution of EUR 11 million. Preliminary 
results include the following: 
1- 7000 families in 17 municipalities involved in processes of income generation and 
productive projects. Aspects such as cooperatives, food security, commercialization, and 
access to financial assets are addressed.  
2- Peace initiatives strengthened [among] farmers, indigenous and afro-descendent 
communities, involving over 20.000 inhabitants.  
3- Environmental protection and recuperation of marine ecosystems in 13 municipalities 
(departments of Chocó, Valle and Cauca). 
4.2 WIDER CONSEQUENCES OF EU FRAMEWORKS AND POLICIES 
Although the EUTFs and the FRT can be assessed on their own merits, for any comprehensive 
understanding it is crucial to understand that they are intertwined with and impact on the EU’s general 
external relations policies, in particular on EU development and external migration policies and legal 
acts. They therefore constitute central tools for the EU to do ‘foreign policy through funding’ in ways 
that profoundly challenge the role given by the Treaties to the EP as a ‘co-owner’ and legislator in some 
of these policy domains.  
In assessing the wider consequences of the EU funding vehicles looked at in this study, here we focus 
on the EUTF for Africa and the FRT, in light of their policy salience. It is clear that these initiatives have 
implemented important projects in Africa and Turkey. The Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) project 
in Turkey is a humanitarian aid intervention with interesting features.184 However, the scope of this 
study does not extend to assessing the project-level ‘added value’, particularly concerning their 
qualitative results (societal effects and human rights impacts) on the ground, or the consistency of the 
latter with the general or overall objectives laid down in their results-monitoring frameworks.  
Our analysis shows, however, that the ‘emergency-driven’ nature of these EU funds makes it difficult to 
ascertain clear and specific policy objectives corresponding with or closely tied to EU policy objectives 
laid down in the Treaties and secondary legislation covering EU development and external migration 
policies. This in turn makes the scrutiny of the actual quality and value of their results on the ground – 
                                                             
182 Ibid. 
183 Information received on 12 of December, 2017 following the information request to DG DEVCO. 
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and their compatibility with EU policy objectives and legal commitments (the extent to which some of 
the results of these projects may actually run counter to some of the general objectives and legal 
commitments) – a rather challenging enterprise in practice. 
This study primarily focuses on the level of governance, management, monitoring and oversight. That 
notwithstanding, it is clear that these funding vehicles are also instrumental to the EU’s pursuit of policy 
objectives on external migration. In the case of the FRT, as explained above, its very existence is closely 
linked at the policy level to the implementation of the EU–Turkey Statement or ‘deal’ of March 2016, 
although legally there may not be a formal or direct link between the two. Similarly, the EUTF for Africa 
was instrumental in obtaining a declaration at the EU–Africa Summit on migration at Valetta in 
November 2015.  
What the EUTF for Africa and the FRT thus share is that their policy raisons d’être are non-legally binding 
political declarations. In the case of the EU–Turkey Statement, is a ‘press release’ to which no EU 
institution appears to want to be a party, and where despite their ‘political nature’, the European 
Parliament has been actively excluded from decision-making regarding the ‘policy choices’ made.185  
This cannot be seen in isolation, but rather as a trend in which different sets of non-binding extra-Treaty 
documents steer funding decisions, also channelled through extra-budget structures (EUTFs). This is 
quite a different approach from the EU’s regular one to international agreements, where the Treaty-
based mechanisms would apply, such as a consent of the EP. It effectively means that the EP was not 
entitled to secure a democratic debate over the political context and priorities in which these funding 
vehicles have been established. This is an observation about the challenges to the legal and democratic 
order that the Lisbon Treaty was to herald in the EU. If the funding instruments are to be truly ‘political’, 
the EP is the only actor in the EU able to provide the venue for a political debate on which priorities and 
choices to pursue when the EU goes abroad on development, humanitarian and migration policies. 
Furthermore, the EUTF for Africa and the Commission-proposed Partnership Framework are clearly 
interlinked. This is explicitly stated but it is also clear from the joint processes of reporting. As described 
above in the case study on Ethiopia, this means that where a country is selected under the Partnership 
Framework as a ‘compact’ country, the EUTF for Africa is seen as instrumental for the attainment of the 
Partnership Framework objectives. This fits with the wider policy outlook at the EU level, clearly 
positing the more-for-more conditionality approach as crucial for obtaining more cooperation with 
third countries, especially on return and readmission of irregular immigrants and asylum seekers.186 On 
the other hand, it would seem at odds with longer standing EU approaches in EU external migration 
policies, which rather stress a ‘balanced’ approach among different pillars.187 
This underlines that for a comprehensive understanding of the EUTF for Africa’s role in EU external 
migration policies, it is crucial to assess the rationales of incentives and demands in EU external 
migration policies. We could not establish whether conditionality on readmission and return was 
widespread across all the windows of the EUTF for Africa (e.g. beyond the case of Ethiopia). However, 
in this case questions arise over what the basis of project selection actually is, as there appears to be 
unspoken policy ‘eligibility’ criteria before projects are actually approved, namely cooperation on 
issues such as return and readmission. Although the use of conditionality for example on human rights 
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clauses is certainly not new in EU external funding instruments, using it to obtain migration 
management objectives, such as on returns, does change the policy priority structure in the EU 
relations with Africa. Moreover, academic and policy knowledge suggests that such conditionality may 
not be so straightforward and easy to apply, and it may run counter to legal commitments on 
fundamental human rights.188  
The EUTF for Africa also helps to set in motion a changing conceptualisation of the ‘migration and 
development’ concept. The work on migration and development has been developed at various 
international levels (notably, the Global Forum on Migration and Development), as well as by the EU. 
The EU funded, and continues to fund, several programmes aimed at harvesting the development 
benefits of migration.189 This approach – essentially entailing ‘migration for development’ – is a major 
area of work also at the UN level and its agencies. What the EUTF for Africa has resuscitated, however, 
is the idea of ‘development against migration’. This is the idea of the ‘root causes’ of migration, which 
the EUTF for Africa is aiming to address. Although commendably motivated by considerations of saving 
people from a dangerous journey to Europe through irregular channels (actual legal channels to 
Europe for third-country nationals then need to be provided, of course), the hypothesis that 
development can curb migration is still just that after some academic research: a hypothesis.190  
Moreover, at the meta level, the conceptualisation of development against migration subjects 
development funding allocation to rationales of where the migration inflow ‘origins’ and ‘routes’ are. 
Such origins and routes may happen to be the places where the greatest development needs or 
potential are located, but not necessarily. Although translated in the European Consensus on 
Development in many sub-fields and priorities, the ultimate constitutional objective of EU 
development cooperation remains the eradication of poverty.191 Moreover, the UN framework of 
Sustainable Development Goals should be kept as the key framework of reference for development 
cooperation in any EU-funded initiative. 
For humanitarian aid, the implications of these funding vehicles lead to questions about how the 
humanitarian principles can be safeguarded. The involvement of humanitarian aid in the FRT, and 
especially the strong role of Turkey therein, challenges the purely needs-based character and the 
principles of neutrality, independence and impartiality.192 
Lastly, the ever-increasing use of EU and Member State funding to safeguard the cooperation with third 
countries on migration faces a structural sustainability challenge. In the long term, this policy approach 
will prove ever costlier for the EU and its Member States. For example, the FRT now has EUR 3 billion 
allocated for the period 2017–18. The policy question now on the table is whether the second tranche 
of EUR 3 billion should be decided upon for further periods. Ending the FRT seems difficult, as it could 
risk overall cooperation with Turkey on refugee protection, border management and return.  
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For the EUTF for Africa, the EU is  facing a funding shortfall, especially for the North Africa window.193 
Nevertheless, the situation changed in December, 2017, especially as financial support for Libya was 
taken back on the agenda.194 This begs the question of what the EU exit strategy out of the increasing 
use of such instruments for policy objectives on external migration actually is. At the policy level, the 
EU may be caught in a circle of financial ‘commitments’ to third countries from which the EU will find it 
very difficult to escape. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study has examined the four EU trust funds and the Facility for Refugees in Turkey from the 
perspectives of their establishment (section 1), governance, management, monitoring and oversight 
(section 2). It has also identified some ‘promising practices’ that could inspire the set-up and 
functioning of EUTFs (section 3). Finally, we have presented some general quantitative results of the 
EUTFs and the FRT, alongside a few qualitative case studies, and examined some of their overall 
consequences on EU foreign affairs policies and frameworks dealing with such sectors as development 
cooperation and migration management (section 4).  
This study does not constitute an audit of results or a comprehensive evaluation of these funding 
instruments or the projects implemented. At a general level, the point of departure of the analysis is 
that the EUTFs put at risk the integrity of the EU budget and the democratic safeguards that govern it. 
The extra-Treaty policy frameworks and instruments (e.g. the EU–Turkey Statement or Valetta 
Declaration) and the coupling with extra-budget tools (EUTFs), brings bilateralism and 
‘intergovernmentalism’ (outside the rationales of the Community method of cooperation) back into 
fields where the EU’s role and policy were actually supposed to be consolidated and expanded under 
the Lisbon Treaty, particularly when securing the democratic control by the European Parliament and 
its role as ‘co-owner’ of EU policy in these domains.  
The EUTFs and the FRT set up new governance procedures that deviate from the ordinary or regular 
decision-shaping and decision-making procedures, thereby inherently posing profound issues and 
potentially leading to more mistrust within the EU and when cooperating with third countries. 
Therefore, ultimately, they should be seen as exceptional or emergency-led instruments whose added 
value and effects on the ground should be very well justified and carefully monitored. Concretely, the 
conditions (necessity) for setting up the EUTFs should be more meticulously taken into account and 
assessed continually by the European Commission in light of EU Better Regulation guidelines and the 
Inter-Institutional Agreement.195 Yet, it is questionable whether under the EUTFs and FRT the best 
available, most cost-effective implementing partner is always selected, or that EU visibility is ensured.  
Recommendation 1 
The European Commission should carry out a ‘fitness check’ under the EU Better Regulation framework, 
to assess whether the EUTFs and the FRT have met the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, 
coherence and EU added value.196 
As to the establishment and origins of the EUTFs and the FRT, section 1 of this study highlights that 
each has its own specific processes of birth and upbringing. One cannot easily compare the context for 
establishing the Bêkou EUTF – where the Central African Republic is mired in armed conflict and forced 
displacement – with the policy context for establishing the FRT as part of a ‘deal’ with Turkey on refugee 
reception and border management. Some of the aspects of the Constitutive Agreement for the Madad 
EUTF for the Syrian Crisis were highlighted as potential examples of good practice, namely in giving 
proportional voting rights to donors to the EUTF, not having the a priori preference for delegated 
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cooperation with Member States, and clearly arguing why it provides added value and 
complementarity.  
The specificity of the FRT cannot be stressed enough, as it does not replace the existing governance 
structures of funding instruments, such as comitology. The EUTF for Africa was highlighted as an 
interesting case in section 1, as it has not become fully clear why an emergency EUTF is needed to 
address the ‘root causes’ of migration, or what ‘emergency’ it was seeking to address in the first place 
or where exactly. Rather a ‘thematic’ EUTF would have been more appropriate in light of the scope and 
intervention logic of the EUTF for Africa, even though that would have excluded delegated cooperation 
through Member States. 
Recommendation 2 
The European Commission should re-examine whether the EUTF for Africa was established correctly as 
an ‘emergency’ EUTF and should duly justify why it does not constitute a ‘thematic’ EUTF. 
 
Section 2 outlines the governance, management, monitoring and oversight of the EUTFs. Clearly, the 
major deviations in comparison with regular EU external instruments concern governance. As the 
EUTFs set up new boards and Operational Committees, this changes the dynamics in selecting projects 
and implementing partners. The phase of needs identification is different too, because there is no 
programming as in the case of projects under regular external instruments. While this may enhance 
speed, it also renders the procedure somewhat opaque, with particular roles for Member States, EU 
delegations and Commission-led quality support groups. In addition, the recurrent dynamic of Member 
States’ projects, lobbied for and not rarely involving their own implementing agencies, gives rise to 
questions over whether the selection process always safeguards a thorough and open-minded analysis 
of all the available options for implementation. The ECA in its Special Report on the Bêkou EUTF also 
rightly mentioned a ‘conflict of interest’ in the project selection procedure of the Operational 
Committee.  
Recommendation 3 
An express clause in EUTF constitutive agreements should be foreseen so as to explicitly exclude 
implementing organisations from the governance bodies.  
 
Regarding management, in principle the Commission follows its regular rules and procedures. 
However, in management, the Commission is attempting to use all existing flexibilities when available. 
This also explains why for the post-selection phase (i.e. after the needs identification phase, once an 
action has been approved by an Operational Committee) it could not be established that the EUTFs 
carry out implementation more quickly than regular EU external funding instruments. Moreover, due 
to the issue also highlighted by the ECA in its Special Report on the Bêkou EUTF, the management fee 
of 5% does not include all management costs.  
Together with the fact that delegated cooperation comes in principle with rather high overall 
management costs, it is not apparent prima facie that the EUTFs ensure a more cost-effective 
management structure than regular EU external funding instruments. The a priori preference given to 
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implementation through delegated cooperation with Member States can be understood from the 
perspective of incentivising them to contribute to the EUTFs.  
Recommendation 4 
The EUTF constitutive agreements should exclude an a priori preference for delegated cooperation 
with Member States. 
 
Our study shows that the EUTFs suffer from a number of ex ante deficits in democratic accountability. 
Through the comitology decision-making involved, the EP can voice its concerns, albeit on a limited 
basis (ultra vires). Where EDF-based EUTFs are involved, as in the EUTF for Africa, this option is not 
available, although EU budget instruments may later contribute to such EDF-established structures, for 
instance the DCI. The set-up of the EUTF for Africa could trigger a rethink of whether the existing 
procedures for establishing an EUTF should be redesigned and framed as a ‘thematic trust fund’.  
This EUTF (unlike all other EUTFs) goes beyond a typical ‘crisis response’ to a country/neighbouring 
region. It rather constitutes a near continent-wide instrument with large resources and with a 
distinguishable impact on the overall external relations on migration and development with Africa. 
Therefore, the EU principle of institutional balance should be better guaranteed here, potentially by 
demanding the establishment of a procedure where the EP would have the right of consent.  
Recommendation 5 
In light of the evolving practice of EUTFs, the procedures for establishing EUTFs should be rethought 
and fine-tuned, in order to include more venues for democratic accountability, preferably in the form 
of a right of consent or a right of scrutiny (or both) for the EP in the constitutive agreement. 
 
The impact on fundamental rights needs to be taken fully into account when designing the EUTFs. The 
European Ombudsman has already concluded in relation to the EU–Turkey Statement and subsequent 
funding via the FRT, that when the EU goes abroad even via a political agreement, fundamental rights 
need to be respected. In addition, establishing such a large instrument should be subject to a proper 
ex-ante and ongoing/regular impact assessment, including on fundamental rights, in light with the 
good governance practices of the European Commission.  
The projects financed can be prone to fundamental rights sensitivities and violations, and are generally 
likely to have an impact on human rights. It is therefore crucial that the EU better monitors and checks 
regularly and systematically whether the potential impacts of funded activities and projects on 
fundamental rights are identified and effectively mitigated by the European Commission in light of its 
formal responsibility of guarantor of the Treaties and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
The European Ombudsman carried out an inquiry on the EU–Turkey Statement, calling for a 
fundamental rights impact assessment irrespective of the actual legal or political nature of the 
instrument at hand.197 This fundamental rights impact assessment should also apply to the FRT if a real 
view of the Statement’s implementation is to be taken on board, and more generally to the EUTF with 
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Africa. As the European Ombudsman has clarified, this process should not be a simple collection of 
data. Instead, the focus should be given to devising an analytical tool for ascertaining specific areas of 
fundamental rights and rule of law risks in a specific partner country’s (national and local) regions 
during the course of a project’s life, for example its effects on minorities or other vulnerable groups and 
communities.198 
Recommendation 6 
Due to the increased use of EUTFs, devising any kind of EUTF should be subject to an ex ante and 
ongoing/regular assessment of the impact on fundamental rights, when the EU goes abroad.  
Building on the European Ombudsman’s inquiry on the EU–Turkey Statement, in order to safeguard 
the principle of good administration laid down in Art. 41 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, a 
fundamental human rights (ongoing) impact assessment of the FRT and EUTFs should be carried out 
regularly by the European Commission.  
In addition, to ensure a more qualitative overview of the project’s societal effects and human rights 
impacts, priority should be given to dedicating more tailored and direct funding to independent NGOs 
– not only as implementing partners of selected projects through national/governmental agencies, but 
also for their role in critically monitoring and conducting ongoing evaluation of the government 
policies of third-country partners, as well as their relations/intersections with EU-funded projects. 
 
The ‘ongoing’ democratic accountability mechanisms of the EP could be strengthened with minimal 
harm done to the autonomy of the exercise of executive power by the Commission. The EP’s de facto 
observer status in the EUTF boards is positive, and the Commission responds regularly to EP questions 
on EUTFs. The EP is not represented in the EUTF Operational Committees, where decisions on the 
actions to be financed are taken. This is understandable, as the Parliament is not part of the executive. 
Still, it would be possible to safeguard the EP’s rights of information and of scrutiny, which it would 
normally have under the comitology structure for funding regulations. It may be possible to replicate 
the EP’s comitology rights in the EUTF structures. 
  
                                                             
198 As the European Ombudsman rightly stated in para. 29 of the above-mentioned Decision,  
There is no universally held view on how human rights assessments should be conducted. There is however a 
common view that this tool is not intended to pass a judgment on the actual human rights situation or to decide 
which mitigating measure may be the most appropriate. In practice, this tool is used either in advance of an 
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the free trade agreement between the EU and Vietnam, the Ombudsman pointed out that the human rights impact 
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demonstrating that all the necessary factors and circumstances have been taken into account in framing a policy. 
The human rights impact assessment tool identifies the sources of risks and human rights on the affected 
stakeholders at each stage of the project’s life. Its role is preventive in the first place because when negative impacts 
are identified, either the negotiated conditions need to be modified or mitigating measures have to be decided upon.  
Refer also to the World Bank (http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/40940-
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Recommendation 7 
The EUTF decision-making procedures of Operational Committees on financing actions should include 
a right of information and a right of scrutiny for the EP, as those under comitology. 
 
The EP has more opportunities for ensuring ex post democratic scrutiny over EUTFs. The main 
accountability venues here are the discharge procedure and right for the EP to request the winding-up 
of an EUTF. The interplay between ex post and ex ante scrutiny, using both in different stages and by 
linking dossiers, can provide a way for the EP to address some of the current democratic accountability 
deficits. For example, general discharge procedures pertaining to the Commission and EDF should be 
better used, to provide for ex post oversight (see subsection 2.3.3). In addition, the procedure linked to 
the special reports produced by the ECA on EUTFs (ex-post) could be further explored so as to link ex 
ante democratic accountability (see recommendation 7 above). 
A further number of monitoring and oversight frameworks exist, as would normally apply, such as 
external audits. The ECA also plays a crucial role, with two more special reports planned for 2018, on 
the EUTF for Africa and the FRT. The Commission has a whole set of internal checks that apply, such as 
the ‘pillar’ assessment of entities carrying out indirect management. The study showed that the 
different EUTFs and the FRT are each developing results-monitoring frameworks, some of them 
promising, with different systems, apps and websites. It would be advisable for the Commission to 
share more of these experiences and potentially identify best practices in results monitoring, to be 
implemented consistently across the EUTFs and the FRT. This would also mitigate the issue of different 
reporting procedures across EUTFs and the FRT. 
Recommendation 8 
Instead of developing individual models for results-monitoring frameworks, the EUTFs and the FRT 
should exchange promising practices and decide on the implementation of a more harmonised model 
consistently applied across the EUTFs and the FRT. 
 
This study has also looked at promising practices from the UN and World Bank’s management of trust 
funds, as well as from the EUTFs. It should first of all be stressed that there is no easy comparison 
between those multi-donor trust funds and the EUTFs, and that the actual extent to which these 
practices are promising or not must be ultimately read from their transferability to the specificities 
characterising the EU legal system and its inter-institutional edifice.  
There are certain features of the approaches by these international organisations that merit interest for 
better ensuring the effectiveness and robustness of monitoring and scrutiny procedures of trust funds. 
The UN example of having a dedicated MPTF Office that facilitates coordination and information 
sharing across different trust funds constitutes one of these. A similar dedicated office for EUTFs could 
help the development of results-monitoring frameworks, with trust funds that already have one 
sharing information with those that are still in the process of developing it (see section 2.4.1). 
Additionally, the UN MPTF Office has an online platform where harmonised financial and governance 
data of all its trust funds is published and updated daily. This may enhance financial transparency by 
enabling the public to access data about donations and transfers of funding and to compare trust 
funds.  
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Whereas financial management oversight would be more feasible for the EUTFs, the harmonisation of 
results monitoring would pose certain challenges. The practical challenges, such as different rules 
applicable to the EDF and non-EDF instruments, and different approaches by implementing 
Directorates-General, should be thought through. In addition, questions of language should be 
addressed, since for example, at the moment all the relevant information about the results of the EUTF 
for Colombia is in Spanish.  
Recommendation 9 
Following the UN’s example, the European Commission should set up a dedicated EUTF office to share 
promising practices across EUTFs and ensure consistent governance and management, including on 
results-monitoring frameworks. A virtual EUTF gateway should also be set up, as a single EU portal on 
EUTFs with easy access to all data regarding the EUTFs’ implementation and financial situations.  
 
In the context of results-monitoring frameworks, it appears that the case studies presented for the UN 
and World Bank show a clearer definition of the trust fund objectives or common set of standards 
against which to measure results, which are aligned with broader strategies, e.g. the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals and national development strategies. By contrast, EUTF objectives are very broadly 
defined and they often lack clarity or legal certainty or a common EU understanding in line with EU 
general principles and fundamental rights obligations. This in turn makes the use of (output, outcome 
and impact) indicators a rather limited exercise from a methodological perspective when measuring 
actual results and impacts on the ground. 
For example, the EUTF for Africa’s objective of ‘migration management’ (and the more-for-more 
conditionality approach identified in this study for the case of Ethiopia) does not even have a firm 
consensus on its definition and may sit uncomfortably with development goals and fundamental 
human rights commitments of the EU and its Member States. The specific standards used by EUTFs to 
assess whether their actions work towards the achievement of an objective may need a more concrete 
specification. This would be the sine qua non condition for a comprehensive qualitative assessment of 
the project results and to ensure that project qualitative outputs may not run counter to other EU legal 
obligations and commitments. 
The study has presented mainly a quantitative overview of the present approval, contracting and 
implementation status of the EUTFs and FRT. It has examined how funding is allocated among types of 
implementing partners and thematic areas or sectors of intervention. The analysis reveals that there is 
a common trend concerning the share of funding given to different types of partners. Indeed, in the 
Madad EUTF, the FRT and the EUTF for Africa, national organisations199 receive the largest share of 
resources, followed by international development organisations, i.e. the UN and World Bank, with 
NGOs only coming third. The allocation in the Bêkou Trust Fund is different, as the largest share of 
funding is awarded to NGOs, followed by national organisations.  
It should nonetheless be noted that this quantitative overview does not show the extra layers of 
implementation sometimes occurring, such as sub-contracting, or who performs the actual activities 
envisaged in a specific project on the ground. As mentioned in the introduction, this is not within the 
                                                             
199 ‘National organisations’ include national ministries, national promotional banks and national bilateral and development 
agencies. 
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scope of our study. Yet, at a more general level, these funds constitute an important shift towards more 
Member State-led implementation, which in turn means a move away from UN organisations 
(agencies) with a circumscribed development and human rights mandate, and a closing space for NGO 
monitoring of potential irregularities, rule of law backsliding and fundamental rights violations. 
Nevertheless, it is often the case that the same UN agencies that are/were active on the ground are sub-
contracted to implement some EUTF- or FRT-related actions.  
The study has also examined the wider interactions of the EUTFs and the FRT with EU frameworks and 
policies. It has underlined that these new funding vehicles are always to be understood in the broader 
EU frameworks on external policies, such as those on development and on migration. Especially for the 
EUTF for Africa and the FRT, it is evident that they are linked to ‘deals’ with third countries, respectively 
the November 2015 EU–Africa Valetta Summit Declaration and the March 2016 EU–Turkey Statement. 
Both of their policy raisons d’être are thus outside the EU Treaties, rather to be found in a political 
‘declaration’ or ‘statement’, beyond a formal international agreement or EU act.200 This challenges the 
legal, institutional and democratic embedding that the Lisbon Treaty was supposed to bring to these 
fields of EU policy. The overall policy logics of the funding implicated (the EUTF for Africa and the FRT), 
as to both their establishment and how they figure in EU external relations, thus originate outside 
Treaty-based procedures. 
The actual linking of the EUTF for Africa and the EU’s Partnership Framework with African countries 
clearly ascribes the funding to a policy logic of more-for-more conditionality on migration 
management, such as on return and readmission. Although a minority of projects actually addresses 
this priority, the EUTF for Africa’s funding is de facto used as conditionality leverage vis-à-vis African 
governments, as the case study of Ethiopia shows. This leads to concern about whether the EUTF for 
Africa is implemented as per its own objectives, or whether it is being instrumentalised to reach other 
objectives of EU external migration policies. 
The EUTF for Africa also drives the conceptual shift in the ‘migration and development’ policy field, 
namely from a ‘migration for development’ to a ‘development against migration’ understanding. Apart 
from the fact that academic knowledge does not support a linear relationship between rising economic 
development and decreasing migration, it also changes the allocation rationale for development aid, 
namely towards the ‘origins and routes’ of migration.  
For humanitarian aid, the implications of these funding vehicles provoke questions about how the 
humanitarian principles can be safeguarded. The involvement of humanitarian aid in the FRT, and 
especially the strong role of Turkey therein, challenges the purely needs-based character and the 
principles of neutrality, independence and impartiality.201 
Recommendation 10 
Special focus should be given to ensuring that the objectives of the trust funds are fully consistent with 
EU general principles and legal commitments laid down in the EU Treaties, and that they build 
‘partnerships’ ensuring a balanced EU policy approach. Projects covering one area must not be 
inconsistent with (or run contrary to) other EU policies and objectives, including on democracy, the rule 
of law and human rights, as well as respect of UN principles and instruments. 
                                                             
200 Carrera et al. (2017), op. cit.  
201 Joint Statement on the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (2008), op. cit. 
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In a nutshell, the realisation that the EU budget’s resources are limited and reaching their boundaries 
should trigger a strategic process within the Commission and the European Parliament concerning 
what the ‘exit strategy’ from the increasing use of ‘emergency funding’ for cooperation with third 
countries on migration actually is. Continuing to rely on ever-increasing funding amounts to obtain 
cooperation with third countries in this field will prove unsustainable in the medium to long term. Over-
reliance on third countries to solve internal EU policy dilemmas may in fact expose the EU to future 
‘crises’ by making cooperation profoundly dependent on the political willingness and stability of the 
third-country governments and authorities concerned.  
Lastly, as these EUTFs and the FRT are considered to be ‘emergency tools’ by their own logics, the 
European Commission should chart a path back to ‘normality’ and ordinary procedures as soon as 
possible. In light of the upcoming Multiannual Financial Framework negotiations and the revision of 
the Financial Regulation, the EU institutions should work together to preserve as much as possible the 
integrity of the EU budget, thereby foreseeing increasing possibilities within the EU budget structures 
to respond to any emergencies. This would reduce the need to set up instruments such as the EUTFs 
and the FRT, which despite their potentially valuable contributions, inherently pose challenges for the 
integrity of the EU budget, its democratic oversight and general EU principles, such as the one of inter-
institutional balance. They also pose far-reaching issues for consistency in EU foreign affairs priorities, 
commitments and policies. All these steps are necessary ways forward in order to ensure that EU 
funding does indeed enhance trust and not mistrust within the EU and when cooperating with third 
countries. 
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ANNEX 1. ANONYMISED LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
No. Type of interviewee Date 
1 Interview with Commission (DG NEAR) 24.11.2017 
2 Interview with Commission (DG DEVCO) 30.10.2017 
3 Interview with Commission (DG DEVCO) 30.10.2017 
4 Interview with Commission (DG DEVCO) 30.10.2017 
5 Interview with Commission (DG NEAR) 10.11.2017 
6 Interview with Commission (DG ECHO) 10.11.2017 
7 Interview with Commission (DG NEAR) 10.11.2017 
8 Interview with European External Action Service  9.11.2017 
9 Interview with Commission (DG DEVCO) 7.11.2017 
10 Interview with Commission (DG DEVCO) 7.11.2017 
11 Interview with Commission (DG DEVCO) 7.11.2017 
12 Interview with Commission (DG DEVCO) 7.11.2017 
13 Interview with European External Action Service 6.11.2017 
14 Interview with Commission (DG DEVCO) 9.11.2017 
15 Interview with Commission (DG DEVCO) 9.11.2017 
16 Interview with European Court of Auditors 8.11.2017 
17 Interview with European Court of Auditors 8.11.2017 
18 Interview with European External Action Service 16.11.2017 
19 Interview with Commission (DG BUDG) 23.11.2017 
20 Interview with Commission (DG DEVCO) 8.12.2017 
21 Interview with Commission (DG DEVCO) 12.12.2017 
22 Interview with Commission (DG DEVCO) 20.12.2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
This study provides a comparative assessment of the governance and 
oversight frameworks of selected EU trust funds (EUTFs) and the Facility for 
Refugees in Turkey (FRT). It explores how these EUTFs and the FRT add to 
and ‘mix’ the instruments set up under the EU Multiannual Financial 
Framework. It addresses the issue of their added value in light of the EU 
Better Regulation guidelines, their impact on the role of the European 
Parliament as a budgetary authority and the right to good administration. 
The study recommends reducing the complexity of the EUTF and FRT 
governance frameworks, and strengthening their consistency with the EU’s 
cooperation efforts in third countries and EU Treaty values. Finally, it 
recommends reinforcing the venues for democratic accountability, 
fundamental rights and rule-of-law impact assessments, which are trust-
enhancing. 
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